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HISTORY, GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE,  
AND POLITICS:  DEFINING THE SCOPE  
OF LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH POWER 
Pekham Pal* 
 
Local boards of health often issue regulations that have broad effects 
that surpass the borders of the city or county to which they apply.  
Promulgation of such rules by board of health members appointed by the 
executive branch implicates separation of powers concerns; because such 
regulations may so extensively burden a locality’s citizens, it may be more 
appropriate for elected officials to adopt these regulations.  Indeed, local 
businesses or other interested parties often bring suit challenging local 
board of health actions.  Courts apply different analytical methodologies to 
review these challenges, which often leads to incongruent local health 
agency discretion for different boards in different states—or even between 
different local boards in the same state. 
This Note suggests that the above concerns implicitly affect how courts 
assess local board of health action.  Based on an examination of four local 
boards of health and their relationships with their local and state 
governments, this Note posits that there are three factors that courts and 
policymakers should examine when assessing the parameters of a local 
board of health’s regulatory discretion:  the locality’s history, the locality’s 
government structure, and the locality’s politics.  By taking into account 
these three factors before applying traditional doctrines of local agency 
review—including nondelegation, preemption, or Dillon’s Rule—courts 
may be better positioned to decide which of these doctrines should apply.  
In conducting this analysis, this Note also furthers the understanding of the 
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Imagine a large city’s local board of health passes a health regulation.  
The regulation requires all sugary drink packages to have a warning that 
indicates overconsumption of sugary drinks may lead to obesity and heart 
problems.1  Health activists view this regulation as a positive step toward 
 
 1. This scenario reflects the New York City “Soda Ban” and antismoking regulations 
analyzed infra Part II.  The Soda Ban is a misnomer created in the media and applied to the 
local board of health Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule that sought to limit the size of 
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creating a healthier population,2 but local businesses and libertarians 
condemn it as being overly paternalistic.3  The local businesses—backed by 
national trade organizations such as the American Beverage Association—
bring suit against the local board of health, seeking to enjoin enforcement of 
the regulation.  Meanwhile, in a neighboring state, a small town passes the 
same regulation, which is also challenged in court. 
Both states’ supreme courts eventually hear the challenges.  Finding that 
the local board of health exceeded its powers, the large city’s state supreme 
court strikes down the regulation.  The supreme court in the small town’s 
state, however, defers to the town’s board of health and upholds the 
regulation.  Are these results contradictory?  Perhaps not. 
The parameters of a local board of health’s4 regulatory powers are 
important for various separation of powers and policy reasons.  First, states 
and local governments may disagree over which government should 
regulate a certain public health matter.  In addition, a local board may 
promulgate a rule that has effects exceeding the locality’s borders.  The 
regulation may also burden citizens so extensively that a legislative body 
would more legitimately effectuate the regulation’s goals.  Moreover, 
political players may intentionally use local boards to subvert the local 
legislative process, presenting separation of powers concerns.  And public 
health agencies often use innovative regulatory methods later replicated at 
the state or federal level. 
Absent uniform judicial analysis of these agency actions, local boards of 
health will be granted disparate regulatory authority, further complicating 
the above separation of powers and policy issues.  Thus, an examination of 
how courts inspect and analyze the scope of local health agency power can 
elucidate the role of local boards of health in the grander struggle between 
local and state governments.  It can also provide guidance to courts and 
policymakers about how future local health agency action should be 
implemented and reviewed. 
 
beverages sold in certain food establishments. See infra notes 5, 208–11 and accompanying 
text.  The example also mirrors a recent San Francisco ordinance that is currently being 
litigated in the Northern District of California under claims of First Amendment violations. 
See Cory L. Andrews, San Francisco’s Sweetened-Beverage Warning Mandate and Ad Ban 
Tread on First Amendment, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/ 
2015/09/11/san-franciscos-sweetened-beverage-warning-mandate-and-ad-ban-tread-on-first-
amendment/ [http://perma.cc/SH7N-5DCZ]. 
 2. See, e.g., Ryan Jaslow, NYC Health Commissioner on Soda Ban:  “We Are Just 
Making Healthy Choices Easier”, CBS NEWS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/nyc-health-commissioner-on-soda-ban-we-are-just-making-healthy-choices-easier/ 
[http://perma.cc/4USD-WHC2]. 
 3. See, e.g., Bettina Elias Siegel, Bloomberg Vs. Big Soda:  Portion Size, Paternalism 
and Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bettina-elias-
siegel/nyc-mike-bloomberg-soda-ban_b_1560967.html [http://perma.cc/6YJK-ZN8Z]. See 
generally Rachael Williams, How Growing Legislation Geared Towards Restricting 
America’s Expanding Waist Lines Is Restricting Consumer Choice, 22 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 145 (2014). 
 4. Unless otherwise specified, this Note uses the terms “health agency,” “health 
department,” and “board of health” interchangeably. 
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Through four cases studies, this Note evaluates the different analytical 
methods state courts have utilized to determine the parameters of local 
health agency power.  What this Note does not do is assess the similarities 
and differences between health regulations—while the first case study 
concerns a sugary drink regulation, the other three studies feature smoking 
regulations.5  Nor does this Note seek to examine the currentness of the 
regulations or statutes discussed. 
To anchor these case studies, Part I describes different forms of local 
government and local health agencies, as well as how and from whom both 
entities are delegated power to act.  It then explores the intricate 
relationship between states, their local governments, and local health 
agencies. 
Part II examines how four localities—New York, New York; Toledo-
Lucas County, Ohio; Tacoma-Pierce County, Washington; and Barnstable, 
Massachusetts—have been given narrow or broad regulatory latitude to 
promulgate public health regulations.  Each case study in Part II.A proceeds 
in two parts:  First, each study gives a brief overview of the locality’s 
history, governmental structure, and local health agency.  Second, it 
analyzes the methods each respective court employed to determine the 
boundaries of each board’s delegated power.  Part II.B compares and 
contrasts the different court’s analytical methods and suggests that these 
decisions, though seemingly disparate, may be consistent. 
Building on this analysis, Part III argues that courts implicitly base their 
reviews of different boards’ health regulations on the history, governmental 
structure, and politics of the localities in question.  In turn, these three 
factors affect whether arguments based on the following are persuasive:  (1) 
state laws and potential preemption reflecting a Dillon’s Rule-like analysis; 
(2) separation of powers and nondelegation issues; (3) prior regulatory 
history; (4) local charters; and (5) agency expertise.  Part III concludes with 
a recommendation that in the future, policymakers and courts should 
examine the three underlying factors—history, governmental structure, and 
politics—in order to determine which health regulations a local board of 
health may properly promulgate. 
I.  THE ROLE OF LOCAL HEALTH AGENCIES IN THE 
GRANDER SCHEME OF LOCAL-STATE GOVERNMENT INTERACTION 
Part I describes the role that local health agencies occupy in government.  
Part I.A explores the relationship between local and state governments.  
 
 5. For a discussion of these issues, see, for example, Rodger D. Citron & Paige 
Bartholomew, The Soda Ban or the Portion Cap Rule?  Litigation over the Size of Sugary 
Drink Containers As an Exercise in Framing, 27 MUN. L. 29 (2013) (examining the city’s 
framing of the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule as a limitation versus the petitioner’s 
framing of it as a ban); Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft 
Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 856 (2000), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1446261/pdf/10846500.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/T9SG-YZYB]; Hery (Michelle) Min, Note, Large-Sized Soda Ban As an 
Alternative to Soda Tax, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187 (2013). 
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Part I.B describes the nondelegation doctrine, how local health agencies are 
created, and the local health agencies’ responsibilities.  Finally, Part I.C 
examines the relationship between these three entities and concludes that 
both state and local governments may exert control over local health 
agencies. 
A.  Local Government Power 
This section describes local governments and discusses their 
relationships with their state governments.  Part I.A.1 examines the 
differences between municipal corporations (cities and towns) and quasi-
corporations (counties).  It also describes different types of local 
governmental structures.  Part I.A.2 explains the home rule doctrine.  Part 
I.A.3 combines these ideas to describe the relationship between local and 
state governments. 
1.  Creatures of the State:  Varieties of Local Government 
Local governments vary greatly.  The term “local government” refers to a 
“unit of government that is closest to the people.”6  Each local government 
is either a municipal corporation or a quasi-corporation.7  A municipal 
corporation is a city or other local political entity that is created by a charter 
from the state8 and is voluntarily organized by local residents.9  The 
municipal corporation administers local affairs by providing public 
services, exercising general police powers, and imposing taxes to raise 
revenue.10  Today, state statutes prescribe substantive11 and procedural 
requirements12 for incorporation. 
 
 6. SANDRA M. STEVENSON, UNDERSTANDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1 (2d ed. 2009).  For 
a history of the development of municipal corporations, see 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW 
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1:1–1:86 (3d ed. 2010). 
 7. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 1:21, at 22–23; STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 3; 
Laura D. Hermer, Municipal Home Rule in New York:  Tobacco Control at the Local Level, 
65 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 328–30 (1999) (drawing a distinction between voluntarily organized 
cities and villages and involuntarily created counties and towns). 
 8. See Municipal Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  A local 
government charter is a document, general statute, or body of laws that grants local 
municipalities the power to organize and function. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 26.  In 
the colonial era, representatives of the Crown issued charters that granted limited powers to 
the colonial governments. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 5, at 
19–20 (3d ed. 2009); see also infra notes 83–91 and accompanying text (describing 
charters). 
 9. This is usually done through a vote or petition. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 6, at 
22.  In some instances, municipalities such as towns and cities predate the creation of states. 
See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, §§ 1:10–1:13.  After the American Revolution, the newly 
characterized states reaffirmed local government existence and power. See infra note 48. 
 10. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 3. 
 11. Substantive requirements may include, for example, a minimum population. See 
REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 67, at 243–46. 
 12. Procedural requirements may describe the petitioning and approval process for 
incorporation. See id. § 68, at 246–49. 
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By contrast, states create quasi-corporations.13  Quasi-corporations act as 
state administrative agents, existing to serve state needs and interests.14  
Because they are not created by residents (like municipal corporations), 
quasi-corporations are often described as “involuntary.”15  Quasi-
corporations such as counties supervise various tasks such as discharging 
judicial functions, repairing roads, and maintaining official documents.16 
Most states have a combination of cities, towns, and counties that can be 
organized in a variety of ways.17  Town inhabitants control local 
governments by meeting and directly voting on issues, whereas in larger 
cities, citizens’ representatives undertake these responsibilities.18 
Towns are considered smaller versions of cities.19  Counties, however, 
are fundamentally different from cities and towns because they are created 
by the state and not by the consent of the people who they govern.20  
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, counties began to take on policy-
making responsibilities—responsibilities that were traditionally seen as 
responsibilities belonging to municipalities.21  Despite these differences, 
both municipal corporations and quasi-corporations are limited in some way 
by state law.22 
In municipal corporations, local inhabitants choose to implement one of 
the types of government described by state statute.23  These options may 
include the mayor-council form and the council-manager form, the two 
 
 13. See id. § 6, at 20–23. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. at 21–22. 
 16. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 1:30, at 37; REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 8, at 28. 
 17. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 1.  State law may consolidate a city or town with 
the county that geographically encompasses it, either in a way that consolidates the two 
entities’ powers or in a way that allows each to retain each other’s functions. See 
MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 2:46, at 264–66. 
 18. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 1:33, at 43.  New England towns are distinct from 
towns elsewhere in the nation because of their precolonial history as communities with a 
civil and religious center. See id. § 1:35, at 45–48.  Though they are called “towns,” they are 
actually quasi-corporations in which all of the inhabitants are members. See id. § 1:35, at 45.  
One case study this Note examines involves the town of Barnstable, Massachusetts. See infra 
Part II.A.4.  Though Barnstable is a town in New England, it is not this type of New England 
town, but rather a “body politic and corporate”—in other words, it is a city (municipal 
corporation) with home rule powers. CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, §§ 1-1 to 1-4 
(2004), http://www.townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf [http://perma.cc/EC5R-
LQ4H]; see also infra notes 56–71 (describing home rule). 
 19. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 1:33, at 43. 
 20. See id. § 2:54, at 283–87. 
 21. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 8 (6th ed. 2004); REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 8, at 28–29.  
Counties may be granted home rule, which perhaps explains why some have taken on more 
nontraditional county responsibilities. See infra notes 68–69.  This shift may explain why 
some courts have held that a county is a municipal corporation. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 
6, § 2:53, at 273–74. 
 22. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 1:21, at 23; see also infra Part I.A.2. 
 23. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 18, at 61. 
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most widely used types of municipal governance.24  In mayor-council 
governments, both the mayor and the local legislative body are generally 
elected by voters and share power.25  Mayor-council governments may be 
further split into the weak-mayor system and the strong-mayor system.26  In 
the former, a large city council has more power than the mayor:  city 
department heads are usually chosen by the council or elected by voters, 
and the mayor has limited veto power over legislative action.27  In the latter, 
the mayor is the city’s chief administrative officer:  he or she retains 
appointment and removal power over most city department heads and has 
significant veto power.28  The council retains control over policy making.29 
In council-manager governments, the city council performs legislative 
and policy-making functions but has no administrative function.30  The 
council appoints and removes the city manager.31  The city manager is the 
head administrative officer and has supervisory power over the heads of 
most city departments; generally, the city manager has appointment and 
removal power over these heads, but such power may be subject to council 
consent.32  When control is given to a legislatively appointed city manager 
as opposed to an elected mayor, politics are theoretically excluded from the 
government’s daily operation.33 
Quasi-corporation governance is distinct from city and town 
administration.  States often set up a board of commissioners to govern 
counties.34  Counties may also have officers who share the responsibility of 
discharging state services in the locality; these officers include, among 
others, a clerk of courts, a treasurer, a prosecuting attorney, a sheriff, and a 
superintendent of schools.35  Board members and officers are elected by the 
people or appointed by the board of commissioners.36  The board is in 
charge of both policy making and its administrative functions.37  Unlike 
 
 24. See id. § 19, at 62; id. § 21, at 66.  A less common government form not applicable 
to any case study in this Note is the commission plan.  For more information, see id. § 20, at 
63–66. 
 25. See id. § 19, at 62–63. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. § 19, at 62. 
 28. See id. § 19, at 62–63; see also Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower 
Weak Cities?  On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542 
(2006) (advocating for strong municipal executives on the basis that they are more efficient 
and provide for accountability and transparency); cf. Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism:  
State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 554–60 
(2001) (noting that states that eschew the unitary executive model of government have 
weaker governors who lack extensive power to lead and control the bureaucracy, leading to 
what some consider “bizarre or idiosyncratic” state administrative law procedures). 
 29. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 19, at 62–63. 
 30. See id. § 21, at 66. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. at 66–67. 
 34. See id. § 23, at 69. 
 35. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 7–8; MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, 
§ 1:29, at 35. 
 36. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 23, at 69. 
 37. See id. 
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mayor-council and council-manager forms of government, board-of-
commissioner governments tend not to concentrate significant power in one 
person.38  Because there is no supervisory position, these governments are 
often considered weak.39  This may lead to pressure to appoint or to elect a 
city manager-type leader.40 
Nevertheless, local governments do not possess inherent sovereign 
authority.41  Thus, both municipalities and quasi-corporations are often 
called “creatures of the state.”42  One scholar has described local 
governments as having two perspectives:  a “bottom-up” perspective—
which reflects the fact that local governments are both elected by and 
responsive to the people—and a “top-down” perspective—which reflects 
the idea that local governments derive their power and responsibilities from 
state constitutions, state laws, and state-granted charters.43 
2.  The Home Rule Doctrine:  
The Source of and Limit on Local Governmental Power 
Because states experiment with different governmental and 
administrative structures, they are often referred to as “laboratories of 
government.”44  Population size and geographical makeup may help 
indicate which government structure best suits a particular locality.45  These 
complex differences are reflected in the variation found within state 
constitutions and local charters, as well as within state and local laws.46 
State governments have inherent, plenary powers.47  They enable 
effective local self-government and intergovernmental cooperation by 
delegating to local governments certain rights, powers, privileges, and 
immunities.48  Thus, state constitutions, state laws, or a combination thereof 
 
 38. See id. § 23, at 70. 
 39. See id. § 23, at 69–70. 
 40. See id.; see supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  Such pressure may or may 
not be acted upon:  while Tacoma-Pierce County, Washington, has provided for a council-
elected executive pursuant to its home rule power, see infra note 320 and accompanying text, 
Toledo-Lucas County, Ohio, has not, see infra notes 266–67 and accompanying text. 
 41. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 23; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (indicating 
powers not delegated to the federal government are “reserved to the States”). 
 42. See, e.g., PETER J. GALIE & CHRISTOPHER BOPST, THE OXFORD COMMENTARIES ON 
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:  THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION 
265 (2d ed. 2012); MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 3:2, at 305. 
 43. Richard Briffault, Local Government and the New York State Constitution, 1 
HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 79, 79–82 (1996); see also BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 
21, at 7–11; infra Part I.A.3. 
 44. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); 2 FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. 
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  DRAFTING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS 13 (2006). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See GALIE & BOPST, supra note 42, at 265. 
 48. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 23.  In some cases, a locality predates the creation 
of the states. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, §§ 1:10–1:13, 1:20.  After the American 
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limit a local government’s authority—if one of these documents does not 
explicitly delegate a power to the local government, a court will likely find 
it does not have the power.49 
Influenced by popular philosophies from the Revolutionary era, states 
first drafted their constitutions to affirm their new statuses as states.50  
Fundamentally, drafters believed the people were best served by states that 
did little governing51:  local governments could best govern because they 
were closer to the people, had the support of local citizens, and could best 
make decisions about the locality’s structure and functions.52 
State delegation of power to local government occurs through the home 
rule doctrine.53  Developed as a reaction to judicial limitation on local 
power (a limitation captured in “Dillon’s Rule”54), home rule authority 
serves the dual function of granting power to localities while also acting as 
a constraint on state control over those localities.55  Home rule essentially 
gives local governments independence and control over local matters.56 
“Dillon’s Rule” traditionally limited local government power.57  Dillon’s 
Rule is a common law rule of statutory interpretation that dictates that local 
governments have the following powers:  (1) those expressly granted to 
them, (2) those necessarily or incidentally implied through the expressly 
granted powers, and (3) those that are essential to the achievement of the 
 
Revolution, state legislatures granted municipal charters to those already established 
localities; thus, “legislative supremacy over the municipality was recognized whether so 
intended or not.” MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 1:20, at 21. 
 49. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 23. 
 50. See William B. Munro, An Ideal State Constitution, 181 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (1935), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1019357 (noting that some states simply 
adopted their colonial charters) [http://perma.cc/UE9W-BCUP]; see also SCOTT GORDON, 
CONTROLLING THE STATE:  CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT ATHENS TO TODAY 294–99 
(1999) (describing the initial adoption of state constitutions).  For more on inaugural 
constitutions, see JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 9–10 
(2006). 
 51. See Munro, supra note 50, at 2–3. But see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James 
Madison) (arguing that a concentration of power at a higher level of government better 
avoids problems of factions). 
 52. See HOME RULE IN AMERICA:  A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 1–2 (Dale Krane, Platon 
N. Rigos & Melvin B. Hill Jr. eds., 2001) [hereinafter HOME RULE IN AMERICA].  These 
related concepts were based in contemporary ideas that government overreach into the 
people’s lives could be prevented by separation of powers, checks and balances, and a 
government close to the people. See GORDON, supra note 50, at 297–99; Munro, supra note 
50, at 2. 
 53. See, e.g., REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 111–14. 
 54. See infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
 55. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 111–14.  Reflecting the interconnectedness 
between local and state governments, the home rule grant was originally called imperium in 
imperio, or a government within a government. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, 
at 282. 
 56. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 111–14. 
 57. The rule is named after Judge John Dillon, a local government law scholar and Iowa 
state court judge. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 266–67 (explaining that 
Judge Dillon articulated the rule in response to several mid-nineteenth century cases where 
local governments used public funds to financially assist railroads and other private 
enterprises). See generally 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911). 
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“objects and purposes of the corporation.”58  Further, if any doubt exists 
concerning whether a locality has a power, the court must deny that 
power.59  The rule is not consistently applied60 and is not always named 
when applied.61  Still, courts today use Dillon’s Rule to limit local 
government action in areas where the court thinks a matter is better left to 
the states or to the private sector.62 
From its initial articulation in the mid-nineteenth century, scholars and 
judges have consistently attacked Dillon’s Rule.  Acting on this criticism, 
local governments have endeavored to diminish the limiting effects of 
Dillon’s Rule.63  To give local governments more authority over their local 
affairs, states have enacted constitutional and statutory home rule 
provisions to grant localities general, broad powers to act even absent 
specific state authorization.64  Whether constitutionally or statutorily 
granted, the state constitution is the starting point—it either contains self-
executing language, or it directs the legislature to pass a law to define the 
scope of home rule power.65  In both cases, courts play a significant role in 
interpreting the parameters of the home rule power.66  Ultimately, however, 
the municipality’s charter is considered the main source of home rule 
power.67 
Certain states also provide for county home rule:  if a county decides to 
implement home rule, they may adopt a county home rule charter that 
dictates how to resolve local county matters.68  Thus, these counties are 
more autonomous than a traditional county that is a “mere instrumentality 
of the state” subject to complete state legislative control.69 
 
 58. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:  POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 165 (2d 
ed. 2008); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2285 (2003); 
Randall E. Kromm, Note, Town Initiative and State Preemption in the Environmental Arena:  
A Massachusetts Case Study, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 255–56 (1998). 
 59. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 267. 
 60. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165 (discussing the modern judicial split over whether 
to interpret strictly or broadly the state delegation of powers to local government). 
 61. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 268 (“[A] narrow reading of state-
granted local powers and the desire to limit the power to change legal rules to the state are 
hallmarks of the Dillon’s Rule approach to state-local relations.”). 
 62. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165; Hermer, supra note 7, at 329–30. 
 63. See Hermer, supra note 7, at 329–30. 
 64. See id.; see also 1–21 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW § 21.01 (Sandra M. Stevenson ed., 2d. ed. 2014), Lexis Advance. 
 65. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 111–14. 
 66. See ANTIEAU, supra note 64, § 21.01.  Constitutional home rule exists when a self-
executing state constitutional provision directly grants home rule to localities. See 
REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 112–13.  Statutory home rule exists when the state 
constitution authorizes the state legislature to create home rule laws; this non-self-executing 
constitutional grant must be effectuated by legislative action. See id. 
 67. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 113–14. 
 68. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, §§ 1:26, 1:31; see also infra note 266 and 
accompanying text (describing Toledo-Lucas County’s failure to adopt a home rule charter); 
infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text (describing Tacoma-Pierce County’s exercise of 
county home rule powers). 
 69. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 1:26, at 31. 
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By shifting the balance of state-local authority through the 
implementation of home rule provisions, states hope to counteract the 
limiting effects of Dillon’s Rule.70  Still, some states continue to have a 
Dillon’s Rule-like approach to local government and, specifically, toward 
local public health agency action.71 
3.  The Separation of Powers Doctrine:  
The Struggle for Power Between State and Local Governments 
The foregoing discussion of Dillon’s Rule and the home rule doctrine 
reflects the difficulty courts face in determining which level of government 
is responsible for certain tasks.72  The separation of powers doctrine 
designates different responsibilities to different authorities, both 
horizontally—between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches—
and vertically—between federal, state, and local governments.73  Based on 
the idea that the federal government’s power may be limited through a 
checks and balances system, the doctrine seeks to preserve the people’s 
freedom and prevent tyranny.74  Though no explicit constitutional 
separation of powers provision exists, the doctrine is implicit in the 
document’s text, structure, and organization.75 
Similarly, states generally have an unstated separation of powers 
doctrine76 based implicitly in the federal Constitution.77  For example, 
certain clauses refer explicitly to a state’s “Executive” and “Legislat[ive]” 
bodies.78  Furthermore, the doctrine’s implicit acceptance is reflected in 
state constitutional division of inherent state power among the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches.79 
 
 70. See ANTIEAU, supra note 64, § 21.01. 
 71. See id. § 24.03; BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 272 (calling Dillon’s 
Rule a “Residual Rule” still used today due to continued uncertainty regarding the scope of 
local power); Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the 
Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1867–70 (2013). 
 72. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 14, 266. 
 73. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2–4, at 132–36 (3d 
ed. 2000); see also BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 14–46 (citing canonical 
separation of powers documents, such as The Federalist Papers and Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America). 
 74. See TRIBE, supra note 73, §§ 1–3, at 6–7. See generally GORDON, supra note 50 
(exploring the doctrine’s historical development, as well as its variations and global 
applications); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2d ed. 
1998) (tracing the doctrine’s history and development). 
 75. See TRIBE, supra note 73, §§ 2–3, at 127.  For instance, the Constitution allocates 
certain powers and responsibilities to each branch of the government, which indicates that 
the branches are separate. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. arts. I–III. 
 76. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 
1085 (Ohio 1999) (“The principle of separation of powers is embedded in the constitutional 
framework of our state government.”); Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355–58 (N.Y. 
1987). 
 77. See TRIBE, supra note 73, §§ 2–4, at 133–36. 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 79. See THOMAS C. MARKS, JR. & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  IN A 
NUTSHELL 189 (2d ed. 2003); see also cases cited supra note 76. 
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Moreover, separation of powers may be implicit at the local level.  The 
doctrine applies to “localities that have distinct legislative and executive 
branches.”80  Some local government charter provisions also mandate 
separation of powers.81  Some states courts, however, have found that there 
is no local separation of powers doctrine.82 
The separation of powers doctrine is reflected in the three sources of 
power for local governments:  the state constitution, state legislation, and 
local charters.  First, the state constitution delegates home rule power to 
municipal corporations and sometimes to quasi-corporations.83  If the home 
rule grant is not self-executing, state legislation grants the locality power to 
self-govern.84  Finally, voters approve the municipal or county charter, 
which identifies the corporation’s powers, places limitations on local 
power, and provides a local government framework.85 
The main source of home rule power is the charter.86  Adoption of a 
charter may establish the local government or it may be adopted post 
facto.87  To address changing circumstances, state constitutions and statutes 
often grant local governments authority to adopt or amend old charters, 
which makes local governments more efficient and useful to their citizens.88 
Local charter provisions have the force and effect of laws; accordingly, 
courts interpret them as statutes.89  As charters are specifically written to 
apply to a particular locality, the charter usually takes precedence if it 
conflicts with a law generally applicable to all state localities.90  When a 
charter is silent on a specific matter, a generally applicable law can 
supplement the charter provided the law does not violate the local 
government’s home rule authority.91 
 
 80. Elizabeth Fine & James Caras, Twenty-Five Years of the Council-Mayor 
Governance of New York City:  A History of the Council’s Powers, the Separation of 
Powers, and Issues for Future Resolution, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 126 (2007). 
 81. See, e.g., CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, §§ 1–3 (2004), http:// 
www.townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf [http://perma.cc/EC5R-LQ4H]. 
 82. See, e.g., N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 550–61 (N.Y. 2014) (Read, J., dissenting) 
(implicating that the separation of powers doctrine need not apply at the city level); see also 
Jordan v. Smith, 669 So. 2d 752, 756 (Miss. 1996) (finding that because there is no natural 
law of separation of powers, the doctrine only applies at the local level if the state 
constitution explicitly provides for it); City Council of Reading v. Eppihimer, 835 A.2d 883 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (finding no local separation of powers because the state constitution 
did not explicitly provide for it); Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579 (R.I. 2011) (“After 
considering the arguments raised by the parties, we hold that the separation of powers 
doctrine is a concept foreign to municipal governance.”). 
 83. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id.; STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 26; see also supra notes 23–40 and 
accompanying text (describing common local government frameworks). 
 86. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 113–14. 
 87. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 26; see also supra note 48. 
 88. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 26. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
2015] THE SCOPE OF LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH POWER 781 
Yet “as a matter of black-letter principles, the states enjoy complete 
hegemony over their local governments.”92  The U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,93 “Municipal corporations are political 
subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising 
[state-delegated] powers.”94  States may define the nature of local power, 
modify or withdraw all powers, repeal a local charter, or abolish a 
municipal corporation—all without the local citizens’ consent.95  Still, local 
autonomy requires first that local people control their governments and, 
second, that local governments have authority to make policy decisions 
regarding local interests.96 
Regardless of whether they are constitutional or legislative, home rule 
provisions limit state government interference with powers statutorily 
delegated to local governments.97  For example, home rule provisions may 
affirm the local governments’ rights to appoint or elect their own officers or 
may require state governments to obtain local government consent before 
taking certain actions.98  Thus, the home rule doctrine does not only act as a 
source of power but also as a limitation on state legislative control.99 
Still, local governments may only act in areas of local concern and not in 
areas of state concern.100  Courts have acknowledged that there is 
“considerable overlap” between the two categories.101  Though no clear test 
exists to distinguish between areas of local and state concern, courts 
consider the impact of the legislation when drawing the line.102  If the result 
only affects the local government, the area is likely a local concern and 
within the power of the local government to regulate.103  If, however, the 
result has extraterritorial effect, the matter may be deemed a state concern, 
thereby precluding the local government from legislating in that area.104  
 
 92. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 235. 
 93. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 94. Id. at 178–79. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Briffault, supra note 43, at 82.  Briffault identifies a third component of local 
autonomy—that local governments must also have the fiscal resources to carry out the 
functions they have been made responsible for—that is not discussed in this Note. Id. 
 97. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 35, at 111–14; see also STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 
10. 
 98. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 10; see also BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 
21, at 238–66 (examining other limits on state control over local government power). 
 99. See ANTIEAU, supra note 64, § 21.02. 
 100. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 25. 
 101. ANTIEAU, supra note 64, § 21.05; see also Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (N.Y. 
1929) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (noting that “[a] zone, however, exists where state and city 
concerns overlap and intermingle”).  Local concerns include how land is used and 
developed; choice of government style; how and what local offices, boards, or commissions 
are created; and how local government and agency employees are compensated. See 
STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 27. 
 102. See ANTIEAU, supra note 64, § 21.05. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
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Public health is one contentious area where the line between state and local 
control is unclear.105 
State preemption arises when both the local and state governments have 
authority to act on a specific issue.106  States may expressly or implicitly 
preempt local action.107  To determine if a local regulation is preempted, 
courts consider (1) whether the regulation is in direct conflict with a state 
law and (2) whether the subject regulated concerns an area where the state 
has power to supersede local regulation.108  Thus, the court may consider 
whether the state has restrained local authority.109  Preemption is often 
based in the state’s home rule provision, a provision that usually prohibits 
home rule action that is inconsistent with state law.110 
B.  Local Public Health Agency Power 
This section introduces public health agencies and their role in 
government.  Part I.B.1 explores administrative law principles that apply to 
local health agencies.  Part I.B.2 surveys the makeup and responsibilities of 
local health agencies. 
1.  The Nondelegation Doctrine:  
A Limit on Legislative Delegation of Power to Agencies 
When examining an agency’s regulatory efforts, administrative law is 
necessarily implicated.111  Administrative law addresses three main issues:  
the leadership, appointment process, and general design of administrative 
agencies; the extent of and limits on administrative agency power; and how 
to remedy unlawful agency actions.112  An agency may act only to the 
extent it has been legislatively delegated such authority.113 
An overview of federal administrative principles that have been 
translated to state and local governments provides useful context.  The 
Constitution vests all federal legislative power in the U.S. Congress, which 
gives Congress supreme legislative authority.114  Due to time and expertise 
constraints, however, Congress may statutorily delegate some of its 
 
 105. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164–65.  For example, the “general exercise of police 
powers to protect the health, welfare, and safety and morality of citizens” arguably belongs 
to both state and local governments. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 53–54. 
 106. See STEVENSON, supra note 6, at 28. 
 107. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 347. 
 108. See id. at 361. 
 109. See Kromm, supra note 58, at 252. 
 110. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 347. 
 111. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Administrative Law and the Public’s Health, 30 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 212, 213 (2002). 
 112. See id. at 213–15.  Interestingly, the due process requirements for adjudicative 
hearings, judicial review of agency action, and other aspects of administrative law have 
developed in the context of public health. Id. at 215. 
 113. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165–71; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (“[A]n administrative agency’s power to regulate 
in the public interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”). 
 114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (3d ed. 2014). 
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constitutionally vested power to agencies.115  To delegate legislative power, 
Congress first identifies a social, economic, or scientific problem.116  Then, 
it establishes a general solution with an intelligible principle.117  Finally, it 
statutorily delegates to an expert agency the responsibility to fill in the 
solution’s specific details and to implement the solution.118  Guided by the 
“intelligible principle,” the agency performs this function.119  This process 
reflects the nondelegation doctrine,120 i.e., the idea that “the Constitution 
limits Congress’s ability to confer power on administrative agencies.”121 
A delegation statute may confer executive, legislative, or judicial powers 
on an agency, or it may confer a combination of the three.122  In the agency 
context, these powers are more specifically called enforcement, rulemaking, 
and adjudicative powers.123  The government’s executive branch often has 
significant control over agencies, which includes the power to appoint 
agency members.124  Agency administration has advantages over traditional 
governance:  specialization, expertise, and flexible decision making.125  
Agency officials are often appointed, which potentially implicates 
separation of powers concerns.126 
The nondelegation doctrine is a “logical extension” of the separation of 
powers doctrine.127  To prevent encroachment on the legislative branch’s 
exclusive power to legislate, agencies must be given a precise mandate 
(otherwise labeled an “intelligible principle”) within which to work.128  
Thus, the intelligible principle guides agency action, and the absence of an 
intelligible principle violates the nondelegation doctrine. 
Because overly detailed statutes may become unwieldy, internally 
inconsistent, and difficult to administer, statutes must often delegate broad 
authority to agencies.129  Expansive agency power must be balanced against 
the fact that voters usually cannot hold agency officials accountable for 
 
 115. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 9–10. 
 116. See id. at 9–14. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id.  In fact, Congress may only delegate powers if it provides an intelligible 
principle. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
 120. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 14–23 (describing the federal 
nondelegation doctrine’s development in the United States). 
 121. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS:  IN A 
NUTSHELL 12–13 (5th ed. 2006). 
 122. See Kinney, supra note 111, at 216. 
 123. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 166. 
 124. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 492–512 (describing the President’s 
control over federal agencies). 
 125. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 166. 
 126. See id. at 163. 
 127. See Benjamin M. McGovern, Note, Reexamining the Massachusetts Nondelegation 
Doctrine:  Is the “Areas of Critical Environmental Concern” Program an Unconstitutional 
Delegation of Legislative Authority?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103, 108 (2004).  Like the 
separation of powers doctrine, the Constitution does not explicitly mandate nondelegation. 
See id.; see also supra notes 72–110 and accompanying text. 
 128. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165–66. 
 129. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 9; GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165–66. 
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their actions.130  Accordingly, courts review agency action to determine if 
they are functioning within their statutory guidelines.131  Courts have used 
the nondelegation principle in a variety of ways:  to overturn a statute that 
passed nondelegable matters to an agency, to reform or amend a statute, and 
against an agency that claims they have power to do something that was not 
within their delegated authority.132 
Historically, state supreme courts have used the nondelegation doctrine 
to strike down broad delegations, whereas the Supreme Court has almost 
always found broad delegations constitutional.133  Structural differences 
between the federal, state, and local administrative agency frameworks may 
explain this variance.  For instance, state agencies may not be as intricate or 
refined as the “massive federal bureaucracy,” which may lead state judges 
to mistrust states agencies.134  Moreover, states may delegate regulatory 
responsibility to boards composed of members from the regulated industry, 
which makes regulation susceptible to control by private individuals or 
businesses.135  Additionally, state governments’ propensity toward 
factionalism and inefficiency may manifest itself in problems in agency 
decision making, accountability, and independence.136  At the local 
government level, these issues may be multiplied.137 
In response, state legislatures and courts may develop a more stringent 
state administrative procedure.  This may include stricter application of the 
nondelegation principle at the state level than at the federal.  This arguably 
counterbalances diminished executive and legislative control over the 
agencies.138  Many states also require that statutes contain very detailed 
standards to shield against the grant of overbroad regulatory discretion.139  
 
 130. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165–71.  Agencies, however, are accountable to 
elected branches of government. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 494. 
 131. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 9–10; Kinney, supra note 111, at 217–18. 
 132. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 14. 
 133. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 121, at 28; Gary J. Greco, Survey, Standards or 
Safeguards:  A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 
578 (1994). 
 134. See Greco, supra note 133, at 578 & n.56. 
 135. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 121, at 29. 
 136. See Rossi, supra note 28, at 560–62.  State administrative procedure may also 
include a “rules review process” that is often dictated by the state administrative procedure 
act.  It may also include a “central panel,” which is an independent agency housed by 
administrative law judges that adjudicate regulatory matters. See id. at 562–69. 
 137. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Administrative City-State:  Administrative 
Law in Local Governance (Oct. 9, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(providing a framework for local administrative law).  Professor Davidson notes that in 
reviewing local agency actions, courts should consider the varied nature of local government 
structure and “resist false parallels between the local and federal levels.” Id. at 31.  
Regarding accountability, for instance, “localism can cut in multiple ways”:  based on the 
specifics of the regulated area, risk of agency capture may be higher or lower than at the 
federal level. Id. at 38. 
 138. See Rossi, supra note 28, at 560. 
 139. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 121, at 28–29; Greco, supra note 133, at 578–
600 (dividing the fifty states into three groups based on whether they require strict, loose, or 
“adequate” procedural safeguards). 
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These states must, however, consider the difficulties presented by detailed 
delegation statutes.140 
Finally, agencies adopt rules,141 whereas legislatures enact statutes.  A 
statute is any “law passed by a legislative body,”142 which includes laws 
that grant power to health agencies and local governments.  Informed both 
by their own expertise and by private sector participation, agencies 
promulgate rules to add detail to these legislative mandates.143  A rule is 
“the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe 
law or policy.”144 
2.  Responsibilities and Forms of Public Health Agencies 
The first public health agencies developed in response to the scientific 
understanding that filth causes infectious disease; accordingly, early public 
health agencies oversaw sanitation, sewage, and control of infectious 
disease—three fundamentally local concerns.145  Today, local public health 
agencies have broader jurisdiction:  among other things, they regulate air, 
water, and noise pollution; animal control; smoking in public places; and 
cleanliness of food and beverage production sites.146  Relying on other 
sciences (including epidemiology, toxicology, and environmental 
science),147 public health agencies collect and analyze data, monitor and 
control disease, and create and enforce public health regulations.148  Still, 
they do not have inherent power to carry out these tasks:  in accordance 
with the nondelegation principle, state and local governments must confer 
upon local health agencies the power to do so.149 
Local health agencies vary in structure.  Centralized agencies are 
operated directly by a state’s department of health, and decentralized 
agencies are managed by a local government; some local public health 
agencies are a mixture of these two models.150  Some states have an 
intermediate administrative entity between the state-level health agency and 
local public health agency, which is often called a district health 
department.151 
Most local public health agencies have a board of health that has 
“policymaking or advisory functions” that include issuing health 
regulations.152  Many states require that board members of local public 
 
 140. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 141. These may also be called regulations. 
 142. See Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 143. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 114, at 20. 
 144. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). 
 145. See Kinney, supra note 111, at 213. 
 146. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164. 
 147. See Kinney, supra note 111, at 212. 
 148. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164; Kinney, supra note 111, at 218–20. 
 149. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 150. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id.; Kinney, supra note 111, at 218–20. 
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health agencies be appointed; some states, however, allow board members 
to be popularly elected or allow an already elected legislative body to serve 
as the board of health.153  Law often mandates that board members possess 
certain work experience or educational credentials demonstrating their 
expertise in the field.154 
Most public regulation is geared toward curbing risks to health and 
safety.155  Due to limited resources, health agencies focus their regulatory 
attention on what they deem the most serious risks.156  Different factions or 
interest groups, however, may not always agree with agency decisions to 
regulate.  For example, an antismoking advocacy group may approve of “no 
smoking in restaurants” regulations, while restaurant owners may believe 
that such regulations will diminish their profits.157  And because public 
health agencies are on the “front lines in formulating a response” to such 
highly controversial problems, public health matters necessarily implicate 
politics.158  Moreover, because voters may not hold agencies accountable 
despite these issues, judicial review of a public health agency is 
fundamentally important.159 
C.  The Interaction Between Local Health Agencies, 
Local Government, and State Government 
In recent decades, local governments have attempted to employ 
innovative methods to address modern health problems such as tobacco use 
and obesity.160  Though such innovation cannot initially be utilized at the 
federal level in every instance,161 the import of local innovation is clear:  a 
locality’s innovative methods may be emulated by other cities and counties 
 
 153. See Diller, supra note 71, at 1877. 
 154. See id.; see, e.g., infra note 207. 
 155. See Kinney, supra note 111, at 218–20. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 219. 
 158. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165; Kinney, supra note 111, at 212. 
 159. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165–71. 
 160. See Diller, supra note 71, at 1862; Kinney, supra note 111, at 212 (describing other 
modern public health concerns, such as health issues stemming from terrorist acts like the 
post-9/11 anthrax scare, chronic diseases caused by obesity, and risks to health and safety in 
the environment and workplace). 
 161. See David B. Caruso, Bloomberg Trans Fat Ban in NYC Set Example for FDA, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/08/bloomberg-
trans-fat_n_4239264.html (quoting former New York City Health Commissioner, Thomas 
Farley, as saying, “People used to look to the federal government, [but] [i]t’s much tougher 
to do it at the federal level”) [http://perma.cc/H878-Q8LQ]; see also Jason C. Czarnezki, 
New York City Rules!  Regulatory Models for Environmental and Public Health, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1660 (2015) (noting that New York City can “act as a norms 
leads . . . in other urban centers and national politics” as evidenced by “the popularity of 
smoking bans and the requirement for food menu labeling”); “Fat Taxing” Our Way to a 
Healthier World, 38 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 387 (2015) (exploring how an 
international “fat tax” regime may combat the obesity epidemic); Adam Nagourney, 
Berkeley Officials Outspend but Optimistic in Battle over Soda Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/us/berkeley-officials-outspent-but-optimistic-in-
battle-over-soda-tax.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/V8TZ-6F3C]. 
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or, after sufficient local trial, by the state and federal governments.162  
Local legislative bodies may apply these innovations and pass them as 
ordinances; other times, local health agencies may undertake such 
innovation by adopting rules.163 
Nevertheless, local health agencies may be prevented from regulating 
innovatively because of controversy over whether certain public health 
issues are indeed local.164  Police power to protect the public safety, health, 
morals, and general welfare is delegated from the state to local 
governments.165  Though localities may argue otherwise, public health is 
almost always considered a state concern because circumstances in one 
locality may affect another.166 
Because states have inherent police power, state legislatures enact public 
health statutes to create both state and local health agencies.167  These 
statutes define the public health agencies’ organization, mission, and 
functions.168  The statutes may also delegate power to a local government to 
 
 162. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  For example, New York City’s Sugary 
Drinks Portion Cap Rule compelled some cities to consider implementing their own similar 
rules. See Leon Stafford, Soda Wars:  Cities Seek Restrictions, Taxes to Curb Obesity, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:32 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/soda-
wars-cities-seek-restrictions-taxes-to-curb-o/nS4b2/#__federated=1 (noting that Washington, 
D.C., and Cambridge, Massachusetts, considered implementing similar rules) 
[http://perma.cc/S736-7X52].  Other cities have passed legislation showing their disapproval 
of the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule. See, e.g., Cheryl K. Chumley, Mississippi Passes 
Anti-Bloomberg Bill Banning Bans on Soda Sales, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/21/mississippi-passes-anti-bloomberg-
bill-banning-ban/ (describing a bill, nicknamed after New York City Mayor Bloomberg, 
prohibiting local governments from banning supersized sugary beverages) 
[http://perma.cc/LTG8-RUPB].  Mexico has since implemented a successful soda tax, see 
Willy Blackmore, Mexico’s Soda Tax Is Working, TAKEPART (Oct. 10, 2014), http:// 
www.takepart.com/article/2014/10/10/mexican-soda-sales-down [http://perma.cc/EE2N-
FQPS], which some commentators initially compared to the New York City soda ban, see 
Jeff Stier, With Its Soda Tax, Mexico Repeats the Mistakes of Mayor Bloomberg, FORBES 
(Oct. 10, 2013, 8:00 AM),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/10/with-its-soda-
tax-mexico-repeats-the-mistakes-of-mayor-bloomberg/ [http://perma.cc/DH8Y-H8YK]. 
 163. See Diller, supra note 71, at 1866–67; see also infra notes 208–11 and 
accompanying text (describing the New York City Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule). 
 164. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164–65; Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 1113, 1113–14 (2007) (discussing how state preemption of local ordinances inhibits 
local policy innovation and consequently has a negative effect on state and national political 
processes); see also supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of 
determining whether a particular matter is local or state). 
 165. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 39, at 125–28; see also, e.g., Adler v. Deegan, 167 
N.E. 705, 709 (N.Y. 1929) (finding that home rule authority did not permit New York City 
to legislate regarding the “hygienic conditions of a community” because that is within the 
state’s police power to regulate). 
 166. See REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 39, at 126. 
 167. See C. Arden Miller et al., Statutory Authorizations for the Work of Local Health 
Departments, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 940, 941 (1977); see also GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 
161.  Though some public health concerns are local, concerns such as controlling an 
epidemic may surpass the boundaries of the locality and render it a state concern. See 
Kinney, supra note 111, at 213–15.  Furthermore, with the advent of Medicaid and other 
federal programs that require state administration, state agencies have taken on more public 
health responsibilities. See id. at 216. 
 168. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 161. 
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act in the area of public health.169  Often, local charters further address 
which powers and limits apply to local health agencies.170 
Depending on whether local health agencies are centralized or 
decentralized,171 state law, local law, or a combination of both may 
apply.172  Though state public health agencies serve the state, local public 
health agencies serve a political subdivision of the state—that is, a city or 
county.173  Thus, both localities and the local public health agencies that 
serve them “are subsidiary and largely subordinate to the state.”174  Courts 
interpret relevant constitutional, statutory, and charter provisions to 
determine if local governments and local agencies are acting within their 
delegated powers.175 
Whether local agencies are subject to state or local control may affect 
how their powers are interpreted.  If cities and towns are considered state 
agencies176 but the local charter defines the local public health agency’s 
powers, a local health agency may be considered the agency of an agency, 
or an “agent[] ‘twice removed’ from state control.”177  If, however, the 
local public health agency is considered a creation of state law independent 
of the local government with which it is associated, the agency is ranked 
equally to the local government it “serves”:  the city and the local health 
agency are both state agencies.178 
In the first case, the local health agency is the locality’s “sub-agent[]”:  
the local health agency serves another agency—the locality.179  The local 
legislature who has written the charter that defines the agency’s functions 
thus controls the local health agency.180  Further, the agency’s powers 
should not exceed the local legislature’s powers.181  By contrast, if the 
health agency is a state creation, its powers are defined by state law; in 
 
 169. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 300 (McKinney 2012). 
 170. See, e.g., CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, § 10-7(k)(3) (2004), http:// 
www.townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf (indicating that the town council 
appoints the board of health) [http://perma.cc/EC5R-LQ4H]. 
 171. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 172. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 176. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 177. Diller, supra note 71, at 1867. 
 178. See id. at 1867.  Ohio, Washington, and Massachusetts follow this model. See infra 
Part II.A.2–4.  It is harder to identify which model New York follows. See infra Part II.A.1.  
New York City, for instance, is exempted from many of the state law provisions that govern 
local board of health action. See id.  Instead, the New York City Charter defines those 
powers. See id.  Nevertheless, the NYC Board argued that both they and the city had 
legislative powers, which indicates that at least the NYC BOH adhered to the second model. 
See infra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.  For an interesting exploration of how local 
judges fit into this landscape, see generally Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (2013). 
 179. See Diller, supra note 71, at 1868. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
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theory, the agency’s powers may exceed the locality’s.182  Thus, a 
comprehensive assessment of a local health agency’s powers necessarily 
requires a court to determine which level of government a local health 
agency pertains to.183  To make this determination, a court may evaluate the 
state constitution, state statutes, local charters, or a combination thereof to 
determine who controls the public health agency.184  Though many state 
courts faced with this issue have looked primarily or exclusively to state 
law,185 in some instances they also look to local charters.186 
In this interplay, both state and local governments endeavor to assert 
control over each other.  States may seek to limit city or county discretion 
in a variety of ways:  they may (1) decline to grant certain authority to local 
governments, (2) withhold resources from local governments, or (3) 
statutorily preempt certain local regulations.187  Localities, however, may 
contend that they have implied power to act; alternatively, localities may 
claim home rule authority over public health because it is a local 
concern.188  In response, a court may apply Dillon’s Rule to the actions of a 
local public health agency.189  The next part of this Note explores some 
ways that this conflict has unfolded in the highest courts of different states. 
II.  METHODS TO ASSESS THE REGULATORY POWER 
OF LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH 
This part examines four state supreme court decisions that have analyzed 
the scope of local health agency power.190  Part II.A evaluates how these 
state supreme courts upheld or invalidated regulations promulgated by local 
boards of health.  Part II.B compares and contrasts the methods the courts 
considered in reaching their decisions. 
A.  Four Case Studies:  
From Narrow Construction of “Broad Powers” to Extreme Deference 
Each case study proceeds in two sections:  First, each section describes 
the locality’s governmental structure and local health agency, including 
from whom it derives power.  Second, each section analyzes the state 
supreme court’s decision reviewing the local board of health’s rulemaking. 
 
 182. See id.  In Michigan, for example, health agencies may adopt rules that the local 
governments do not have the statutory authority to adopt. See id. at 1870–71.  Similarly, 
courts in West Virginia have held that the state legislature has delegated to local boards a 
“broad delegation of power.” See id. at 1872.  Accordingly, local boards in Michigan and 
West Virginia have more aggressively regulated indoor smoking than their respective local 
legislative bodies. See id. at 1871–72. 
 183. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 164. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See Diller, supra note 71, at 1868; see also infra Part II.A.2–3. 
 186. See infra Part II.A.1, II.A.4. 
 187. See GOSTIN, supra note 58, at 165. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id.; Diller, supra note 71, at 1870. 
 190. In order to see if there are any geographical trends in how the courts decided the 
cases, this Note looks at cases from New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Washington.  No 
such trends were found among these four cases. 
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Part II.A.1 describes a New York case that focused on whether the New 
York City Board of Health (“NYC BOH” or “the NYC Board”) had the 
power to issue a particular rule.  Part II.A.2 and II.A.3, respectively, 
examine state court decisions from Lucas County, Ohio, and Toledo 
County, Washington.  Both decisions focus on whether the actions of a 
county public health agency conflicted with the higher state power, which 
presumes the county agencies have the regulatory power to promulgate 
these regulations.  Finally, Part II.A.4 describes a Massachusetts case where 
the court considered both issues of whether a Massachusetts board of health 
(“Barnstable BOH” or “the Barnstable Board”) had power to issue a rule 
and whether such a rule conflicted with state power. 
Taken together, these decisions demonstrate two overarching inquiries 
courts make when evaluating the scope of a local health agency’s regulatory 
powers:  First, does the board have the legal authority to promulgate the 
rule?  Second, does the board’s exercise of power conflict with a higher 
governmental power?  Analysis of these two issues provides insight into 
how a board exercises its powers within the grander scheme of the state-
local governmental interplay. 
1.  New York City:  
Drawing a Line Between Rules and Laws 
In New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. 
New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene,191 the New York 
Court of Appeals invalidated the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule which 
regulated the size of beverages sold in food service establishments.192  The 
court examined whether the NYC BOH exceeded the scope of its regulatory 
authority and determined that the NYC Board had engaged in illegal 
lawmaking:  by choosing between competing policy goals without any 
legislative guidance, the NYC BOH infringed on the city council’s 
legislative jurisdiction.193  Unlike courts in Ohio,194 Washington,195 and 
Massachusetts,196 the court here did not focus on whether the NYC BOH’s 
exercise of power conflicted with state law, but rather on whether the NYC 
Board had the authority to adopt the regulation. 
New York City was founded in 1624.197  Cities in New York State are 
municipal corporations voluntarily organized by local inhabitants; cities’ 
powers are defined by the state constitution, the Statute of Local 
 
 191. 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014). 
 192. Id. at 541.  The Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule is informally known as 
Bloomberg’s Soda Ban. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 195. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 196. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 197. See Sam Roberts, New York’s Birth Date:  Don’t Go by City’s Seal, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/nyregion/14seal.html?pagewanted= 
all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4T27-WKUE].  Some controversy exists as to the year the city 
was founded because it was first settled in 1624, but formally chartered in 1653. Id. 
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Governments and the Municipal Home Rule Law, and city charters.198  
Home rule was first adopted in 1894; the New York Constitution was later 
amended both to grant the power of self-government to cities and to limit 
the state’s power to intrude on matters of local concern.199  The first New 
York City Charter applying to all five boroughs was enacted by state law in 
1897 and has been amended more than one hundred times by state or local 
law.200  Though New York localities appear to have considerable control 
over local affairs, the New York Court of Appeals has consistently 
protected the state legislature’s power to enact laws restricting local power, 
often finding state concerns in “seemingly local matters.”201  New York 
City has adopted a mayor-city council form of government.202 
The New York Public Health Law indicates that preexisting local boards 
and departments of health shall continue to exist in counties, cities, villages, 
and towns.203  The Public Health Law does not apply to New York City 
unless specially provided.204  The commissioner of health and mental 
hygiene, who is appointed by the mayor, heads the New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene205 (DOHMH).  The 
commissioner is the chairperson of the board of health.206  The mayor 
appoints ten more board members for six-year terms, and each must meet 
minimum educational and professional requirements.207 
On September 13, 2012, the NYC BOH adopted the Sugary Drinks 
Portion Cap Rule208 (“the Rule”).  In relevant part, the Rule provided that if 
a container were capable of holding more than sixteen ounces, a food 
service establishment could not “sell, offer, or provide” a “sugary drink” in 
that container, nor “sell, offer, or provide” the empty container to be used at 
a self-service station.209  A sugary drink is defined as a nonalcoholic 
 
 198. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX; N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1994); 
Nassau County v. Lincer, 3 N.Y.S.2d 327, 333 (Nassau Cty. Ct. 1938) (reversed on other 
grounds) (describing cities created by charter as corporations and distinguishing them from 
state-created civil divisions). 
 199. See Briffault, supra note 43, at 86–87; Hermer, supra note 7, at 328–31. 
 200. See Fine & Caras, supra note 80, at 122–23. 
 201. See Jeffrey M. Stonecash, New York, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 52, 303. 
 202. See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, §§ 1, 21, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC 
[http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B]. 
 203. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 300 (McKinney 2012). 
 204. See id. § 312; see also NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL MANUAL:  A GUIDE 
FOR JUDGES, ATTORNEYS AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 1 (Michael Colodner ed., 
2011) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL MANUAL], http://www.nycourts. 
gov/whatsnew/pdf/PublicHealthLegalManual.pdf (directing readers to the New York City 
Health Code, the New York City Charter, and the New York City Administrative Code 
instead of the state public health law) [http://perma.cc/65MB-549W]. 
 205. See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, § 551(a), http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC 
[http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B]. 
 206. See id. § 553(a). 
 207. See id. § 553(a)–(b). 
 208. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 541 (N.Y. 2014).  This Note does not seek to 
examine the differences and similarities between beverage regulation—including soda 
taxation—and smoking regulations, which are discussed infra Part II.A.2–4. 
 209. Id. 
792 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
sweetened drink containing a specific amount of calories, sugar or other 
sweetener, and milk or milk substitute.210  Certain establishments subject to 
regulation by the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets 
were exempted from the Rule.211 
Six not-for-profit and labor organizations (some national, some 
statewide) sued then-Commissioner Dr. Thomas Farley, the NYC BOH, 
and the DOHMH.212  Plaintiffs moved for an order to enjoin and 
permanently restrain defendants from implementing or enforcing the Rule 
and further moved to declare the Rule invalid.213  They argued that the 
NYC Board had exceeded its regulatory authority in promulgating the 
rule.214 
The NYC BOH argued that because it was created by the state 
legislature—a contention subject to debate215—it had inherent legislative 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 541–42. 
 212. Id. at 542.  Control over New York City’s public health has changed multiple times 
between the city and the state. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY:  200 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP 12–16 (2005), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/bicentennial/historical-booklet.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q5DJ-BAMA]; see also infra note 215 (describing the development of the 
NYC BOH).  In 2002, voters approved the merger between the Department of Health and the 
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Alcoholism Services, resulting in the 
current Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL 
HYGIENE, supra, at 63–64.  Dr. Thomas Farley was the Commissioner of the New York City 
DOHMH and the chair of the NYC BOH when the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule was 
adopted. See Susan Heavey, Thomas Farley, NYC Health Commissioner, Defends 
Bloomberg’s Big Soda Ban, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 5:12 AM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/thomas-farley-nyc-health-_n_1579700.html [http:// 
perma.cc/YD9M-WTTN].  The executive branch appoints the eleven-member board. See 
NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, §§ 551, 553 http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC [http:// 
perma.cc/8HV4-P32B].  For purposes of this Note, these three parties will be referred to as 
“the NYC BOH” or “the NYC Board.” 
 213. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 542. 
 214. See id.  Plaintiffs also argued that the Rule itself was arbitrary and capricious. See id.  
Like the Appellate Division, however, the Court of Appeals did not reach this issue. See id. 
at 542, 549. 
 215. In 1793, state doctors established New York State’s first health agency in response 
to a yellow fever outbreak. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 
212, at 4 (describing how leading doctors in New York organized a committee with authority 
to inspect ships entering state ports); see also N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 551–53 
(Read, J., dissenting) (describing the state statutes).  In 1805, the NYC Common Council 
established the NYC BOH to gain more direct oversight over yellow fever prevention. See 
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 212, at 4; see also N.Y. Statewide 
Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 551 (Read, J., dissenting) (noting that the term “board of health” 
appeared in state statutes for the first time in 1811).  Ultimately, modern-day control over the 
city’s public health lies with the city. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 
supra note 212, at 63–68.  Although the majority opinion in N.Y. Statewide Coal. did not 
delve deeply into the NYC Board’s historical roots, Judge Read’s dissent examined the 
historical development of the NYC Board to support her position that the NYC Board was 
correct in asserting it was a state creature. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 551–57 (Read, 
J., dissenting).  In Judge Read’s view, the only issue was whether the NYC Board had 
properly acted within the parameters of its state-delegated powers. See id. at 551–54.  
Though the majority agreed with the dissent’s historical analysis of the NYC Board’s 
authority, its statutory analysis focused primarily on the New York City Charter. See infra 
notes 229–34 and accompanying text.  Though a state creation, the NYC BOH is seemingly 
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powers “separate and apart” from the city council.  It therefore argued that 
it had legislative authority to adopt the Rule.216  In support of this 
contention, the NYC Board pointed to language in the New York City 
Charter,217 the history of the NYC Board,218 and other public health areas 
where the NYC Board had previously promulgated rules.219  The NYC 
Board effectively argued that it had legislative—not regulatory—authority 
to adopt the Rule.220 
The court considered, in two parts, the overarching issue of whether the 
NYC Board had the power to promulgate the Rule:  First, it considered 
whether the NYC Board had legislative authority.  Finding it did not, the 
court then applied the test articulated in Boreali v. Axelrod,221 a standard 
used to determine when an agency has crossed the line between rulemaking 
and lawmaking.222  By employing this analysis, the court ostensibly can 
determine if an agency has exceeded its regulatory powers.223 
As to the first issue, the court determined that the only New York City 
body with legislative power is the city council.224  In support of this 
 
unique in that many provisions of the New York Public Health Law do not apply to the city. 
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 312 (McKinney 2011); NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC HEALTH 
LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 204, at 1 (directing readers to the New York City Health Code, 
the New York City Charter, or the New York City Administrative Code based on the 
circumstances). 
 216. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 543. 
 217. See id. at 544; see also NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, §§ 556, 558(b)–(c), http:// 
codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC [http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B]. 
 218. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544–45. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987).  Notably, the Boreali case examined a smoking 
regulation promulgated by the New York Public Health Council, a state agency. Id. at 1353. 
 222. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 545–49. 
 223. See id. at 549. 
 224. See id. at 543–44.  In the modern administrative state, it is unlikely that any court 
would find that a board of health would have “legislative” powers:  though agencies are 
delegated legislative powers, they have these powers only to the extent that they are filling in 
the blanks left by the statute that delegates them that power. See id. at 554 (Read, J., 
dissenting) (“While it may sound odd in the context of modern-day administrative law to call 
an agency’s authority ‘legislative,’ the Board’s authority is quite clearly at least ‘nearly 
legislative.’”); see also supra Part I.B.1; cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989) (holding that a delegation of legislative authority must contain some “intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is 
directed to conform”). 
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finding, the court cited the city charter,225 the state constitution,226 and the 
New York State Home Rule Statute.227 
The court examined two phrases in the city charter to affirm that the 
charter did not empower the NYC Board to create law:  (1) “to adopt local 
laws,” and (2) “all matters and subjects.”228  First, the charter indicated that 
only the city council could “adopt local laws.”229  The charter restricted the 
NYC Board’s rulemaking powers to add to, alter, and repeal provisions of 
the health code, as well as publish additional health code provisions.230  The 
court determined that the authority to publish a health code reflected a 
regulatory mandate, not legislative power.231  Second, the charter was 
amended in 1979 to add the seemingly broad phrase “all matters and 
subjects”232 to the health code provision.233  Legislative history indicated 
that the purpose of the amendment was not to give the NYC Board plenary 
power to regulate all matters, but rather to preclude the NYC Board from 
regulating areas unrelated to health.234 
 
 225. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 543 (noting that the New York City Charter 
provides for distinct legislative and executive branches of city government); see also NEW 
YORK CITY CHARTER, § 21, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC (stating that the city 
council is “the legislative body of the city . . . vested with the legislative power of the city”) 
[http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B]; accord Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent 
Children v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1, 4–5 (N.Y. 1985). 
 226. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544 (“[E]very local government . . . shall 
have a legislative body elective by the people thereof.” (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 1(a))). 
 227. See id. at 544 (citing N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 2(7) (McKinney 1994)).  The 
dissent maintained that the home rule amendment and the home rule law preserved an 
existing board’s power and laws, indicating that the institution of home rule in New York did 
not eradicate the NYC Board’s lawmaking powers. See id. at 555 (Read, J., dissenting) 
(citing N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW §§ 50(3), 56(1)). 
 228. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544; see also NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, 
§§ 28(a), 558(c), http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC [http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B]. 
 229. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544; see also NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, 
§ 28(a), http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC (“The council in addition to all 
enumerated powers shall have power to adopt local laws which it deems appropriate . . . .”) 
[http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B]. 
 230. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544; see also NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, 
§ 558(b), http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC [http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B].  The 
Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule was adopted as an amendment to an article of the health 
code. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 541. 
 231. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544. 
 232. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, § 558(c), http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC (“The 
board of health may embrace in the health code all matters and subjects to which the power 
and authority of the department extends.”) [http://perma.cc/8HV4-P32B]. 
 233. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544–45.  This reflected a Dillon’s Rule-like 
analysis. 
 234. See id. at 544 (citing a report by the city’s committee on health that indicated that the 
amendment addressed concerns that the NYC Board was passing overly broad regulations 
that invaded the city council’s legislative territory); cf. Diller, supra note 71, at 1870 
(describing the Supreme Court of Washington’s similar analysis as a “Dillon’s Rule-like 
approach to the agency’s power”). Compare infra notes 282–92 and accompanying text 
(describing how the Ohio Supreme Court accepted the argument that broad statutory 
language could be limited by other provisions of the Ohio Revised Code), with infra notes 
385–88 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Judicial Court of 
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The court further explained why the NYC Board was incorrect in arguing 
that its powers were legislative and not regulatory.  The court was troubled 
that the NYC BOH did not address what would happen if the NYC Board 
passed a “health law” that conflicted with a city council law.235  This 
provided additional support to the argument that the NYC Board could only 
enact “rules with the force of law”—an action distinct from and less 
powerful than passing a “legislative law.”236  The court continued that the 
NYC Board’s emphasis on two cases that had made “passing references” to 
the NYC Board’s “legislative authority” was misplaced.237  Ultimately, the 
court concluded it was clear that the NYC Board had no legislative 
authority, but “only a regulatory mandate.”238  Thus, the court implicitly 
found that the NYC BOH was an agency twice removed.239 
The second part of the court’s analysis focused on whether the “difficult-
to-define line” between legislative policymaking and administrative 
rulemaking had been crossed; namely, the court examined whether the 
nondelegation doctrine had been violated.240  To determine this, the court 
applied Boreali, New York courts’ “go-to” case241 to assess whether an 
agency has exceeded its delegated powers.242  There, the court identified 
four “coalescing circumstances” that a court should analyze to determine if 
an administrative rule has “run[] afoul of the constitutional separation of 
powers doctrine”:  (1) whether the regulation considers factors not related 
to the stated purpose of the regulation; (2) whether the regulation was 
created on a “clean slate” without the benefit of legislative guidance; (3) 
 
Massachusetts rejected the argument that a broad statutory delegation of powers could be 
limited by other statutory language). 
 235. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 545. 
 236. Id.  Though similar to a preemption analysis, this action is distinct:  this type of 
same-level-of-government conflict reflects the Boreali separation of powers analysis 
conducted later in the opinion. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1357 (1987) 
(noting that when “a perceived conflict between legislative policy and administrative action 
at the same level of government is at issue,” the preemption doctrine does not apply). 
 237. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 545.  By contrast, the dissent found these cases to 
be very persuasive, noting “[i]t is impossible to wish away the large body of caselaw [sic] in 
which we have repeatedly described the source of the Board’s delegated authority” to be the 
New York State Legislature. See id. at 554 (Read, J., dissenting).  The dissent implied that 
both NYC and the NYC BOH are state agencies. See supra notes 176–86 and accompanying 
text. 
 238. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 544. 
 239. See supra notes 176–86 and accompanying text. 
 240. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 545–46. 
 241. See id. at 545 (“Because a doctrine of separation of powers [is] delineated in the City 
Charter . . . Boreali provides the appropriate framework.”). 
 242. Id.  The dissenting opinion in N.Y. Statewide Coal., for example, took issue with 
Boreali’s application to the instant case, explaining that Boreali relied on the New York 
State Constitution and did not apply to questions of local government power. Id. at 558 
(Read, J., dissenting).  It maintained that Boreali could not apply if the NYC Board did not 
derive its power from the state. Id.; accord Min, supra note 5, at 204–06 (arguing Boreali 
should not apply in the Soda Ban context); see also supra note 238.  Indeed, Boreali 
examined a smoking ban promulgated by the Public Health Council, a state agency. See 
Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (N.Y. 1987). 
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whether there was legislative inaction; and (4) whether the regulation 
involved technical expertise.243 
Yet instead of strictly applying the Boreali coalescing circumstances,244 
the court emphasized Boreali’s underlying policy that the people’s elected 
representatives should legislate difficult social problems.245  Through 
examination of the first three Boreali factors,246 the court explained why 
each factor indicated that the NYC Board had engaged in policymaking that 
should be left to the elected representatives.247  First, in adopting an indirect 
method of regulating soda consumption as a way to combat obesity, the 
NYC Board had improperly made a policy decision based on “complex 
value judgments” properly left to elected officials.248  Second, neither the 
city council nor the state legislature had legislated in the area of sugary-
beverage consumption.249  Accordingly, the Rule did not merely fill in the 
details of a legislative statute or ordinance, but effectively made law.250  
Finally, the city and the state legislatures’ inaction in this area indicated the 
NYC Board was making a new policy decision.251  Therefore, regardless of 
“which arm of government first proposed or drafted” the Rule and 
regardless of “whether the [NYC] Board exercised its considerable 
professional expertise or merely rubber-stamped a rule drafted outside the 
agency,” the Boreali analysis rendered the Rule invalid.252 
2.  Toledo-Lucas County:  
Granting Only “Specific” Broad Powers 
In D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas County Board of Health,253 the Ohio 
Supreme Court declared that local boards of health do not have authority to 
prohibit smoking in all public places.254  The court examined whether the 
Board of Health of Toledo-Lucas County Regional Health District (“TLC 
BOH” or “the TLC Board”) had power to prohibit smoking in all public 
 
 243. Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1355–58. 
 244. The dissent criticized the majority’s “flexible approach” to the coalescing 
circumstances. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 558–561 (Read, J., dissenting). 
 245. Id. at 545–49 (majority opinion).  The NYC BOH is appointed. See supra notes 205–
07 and accompanying text. 
 246. It did not assess the fourth factor. See id. at 548–49 (“[T]he Boreali factors do not 
constitute rigid conditions.”). 
 247. Id. at 545–49.  By contrast, the intermediary appellate and trial courts had 
specifically analyzed all four factors by focusing more on the actual test than its underlying 
policy. See In re N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); N.Y. Statewide Coal. of 
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 
653584/12, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). 
 248. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 547–48. 
 249. See id. at 548. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. 
 252. Id. at 549. 
 253. 773 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 2002).  For another analysis of this case, see Kenneth J. 
Heisele, Cases Involving the Interpretation of State and Federal Statutes, 29 OHIO N. UNIV. 
L. REV. 728, 740–48 (2003). 
 254. See id. at 547. 
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places based on the authority delegated to it in Ohio Revised Code 
§ 3709.21.255  It concluded that although Ohio state law delegated broad 
authority to the TLC BOH to regulate some specific public health matters, 
state law did not delegate to the TLC Board unlimited power to promulgate 
regulations concerning all public health matters.256  Thus, the court 
considered the same question raised in the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule 
context257:  Did the TLC Board have the power to promulgate this rule?  
Instead of focusing its inquiry on whether the TLC Board had the authority 
to adopt the regulation pursuant to local law,258 the court considered 
whether the TLC Board’s powers conflicted with higher state law—similar 
to analyses conducted by the Washington259 and Massachusetts260 courts, 
discussed below. 
In 1788, Toledo-Lucas County was established as an administrative arm 
of the Ohio Territory government.261  The city of Toledo is within Lucas 
County, Ohio.262  Unlike townships and cities that are separate corporate 
bodies with the ability to exercise police powers, counties are considered 
extensions of the state that simply implement state law and state policy.263  
Counties, however, do encompass townships and cities.264 
In 1933, a state constitutional amendment allowed counties the option to 
gain home rule powers if the county voters ratified a home rule charter.  
The amendment gave counties the freedom to self-govern and limited the 
state legislature’s involvement in the county’s affairs.265  Lucas County, 
however, has not ratified a home rule charter.266  Accordingly, the county is 
administered by nine officers who are elected to four-year terms to the 
board of county commissioners.267  Lucas County, unlike a municipality 
that has adopted a home rule charter, is thus a “creature of the state” subject 
to state control.268  Ohio is divided into general health districts.269  Each 
 
 255. See id. at 541–47; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.21 (West 2011) (“The 
board of health of a general health district may make such orders and regulations as are 
necessary for its own government, for the public health, the prevention or restriction of 
disease, and the prevention, abatement, or suppression of nuisances.”). 
 256. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 547. 
 257. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 258. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 259. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 260. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 261. See About Us, LUCAS COUNTY, http://co.lucas.oh.us/index.aspx?NID=7 (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/V9TK-5WHY]; see also BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW—COUNTY § 1:1 (Thomson Reuters 2010) [hereinafter BALDWIN’S OHIO 
PRACTICE]. 
 262. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 539. 
 263. See BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE, supra note 261, § 1:1. 
 264. See Jack L. Dustin, Ohio, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 52, 330–31. 
 265. See OHIO CONST. art. X, §§ 1–4; Dustin, supra note 264, at 333; Stephen Cianca, 
Home Rule in Ohio Counties:  Legal and Constitutional Perspectives, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
533, 533 n.1 (1994). 
 266. See BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE, supra note 261, § 1:2; Cianca, supra note 265, at 
535 n.13. 
 267. See OHIO CONST. art. X, § 1; BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE, supra note 261, § 1:2. 
 268. See Cianca, supra note 265, at 536. 
 269. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.01 (West 2013). 
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health district, including the Toledo-Lucas County Regional Health District, 
has a board of health, which consists of appointed members.270 
On May 24, 2001, the TLC BOH adopted the Lucas County Regional 
Health District Clean Indoor Air Regulation (“the Regulation”), a rule 
prohibiting smoking in all public areas.271  The TLC Board cited § 3709.21 
of the Ohio Revised Code as the source of its power to pass the 
Regulation.272 
Twenty-seven trade associations and small businesses sued the TLC 
Board, seeking an injunction barring enforcement of the Regulation.273  
They raised several state law claims and one federal law claim, contending 
that the Regulation’s promulgation was beyond the TLC Board’s legislative 
authority under the applicable provisions of the Ohio Revised Code and that 
the Regulation was an illegal legislative act.274  The TLC Board removed 
the action to federal court, which certified four Ohio state law questions to 
the Ohio Supreme Court.275 
Of these four, the Ohio Supreme Court focused on one question:  “Does 
the Ohio Revised Code authorize or delegate to a local board of health of a 
general health district the authority to prohibit smoking in all public places 
as defined by the Regulation at issue herein?”276  The TLC BOH contended 
 
 270. See id. § 3709.02; D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 773 N.E.2d 
536, 539 (Ohio 2002).  For purposes of this Note, both the regional health district and its 
board will be referred to as “the TLC Board” or “the TLC BOH.” 
 271. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 539.  “Public area” was defined as all enclosed, indoor 
areas where the general public is invited or normally permitted. See id.  The Regulation 
further proscribed smoking within twenty feet of entrances and of open windows at these 
public areas and mandated criminal penalties for violators and for owners of public places 
who did not enforce the Regulation. See id. 
 272. See id.  In relevant part, Ohio Revised Code § 3709.21 provides, 
The board of health of a general health district may make such orders and 
regulations as are necessary for its own government, for the public health, the 
prevention or restriction of disease, and the prevention, abatement, or suppression 
of nuisances. . . .  All orders and regulations . . . shall be adopted, recorded, and 
certified as are ordinances of municipal corporations and the record thereof shall 
be given in all courts the same effect as is given such ordinances. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.21 (West 2011). 
 273. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 539.  The small businesses included several bars, 
restaurants, a bowling alley, and a cigar lounge. See id. 
 274. See id. 
 275. See id. at 540. 
 276. See id.  Because the court answered this first question in the negative, it declined to 
answer the remaining certified questions.  The other three questions asked what would 
happen if a board of health had authority to promulgate the smoking regulation, but their 
regulation conflicted with one or more of the following:  the Ohio Constitution, state statute, 
and/or a local legislative ordinance. See id. at 540, 547.  The state statute provided for 
“nonsmoking areas in places of public assembly,” but delegated authority to designate the 
nonsmoking sections to the local fire authority, the director of administrative services of a 
state agency, or the person controlling the place of public assembly. Id. at 540; OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3791.031.  The Toledo Municipal Code, chapter 1779, regulated smoking 
within the city and permitted smoking to some extent in businesses like the ones owned by 
plaintiffs. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 540; cf. infra notes 337–40 and accompanying text 
(describing how Washington did reach this question of whether the state smoking statute 
preempted the local board’s regulation); supra notes 228–34 and accompanying text 
(describing how New York City and Massachusetts examined the issue of health regulations 
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that § 3709.21 vested it with a broad and independent authority to adopt any 
regulation necessary to protect the public health.277  It further argued that 
any regulation adopted pursuant to § 3709.21 that was (1) “necessary to 
protect the public health” and (2) “reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and 
consistent” with the Ohio constitution was valid.278  By contrast, the local 
businesses argued that § 3709.21 was simply an enabling statute that 
conferred rulemaking powers on the boards of health; it did not grant local 
boards plenary authority to regulate any and all public health concerns.279 
Similar to New York Court of Appeals’s analysis, the court here 
addressed two overarching issues280:  First, the court examined whether the 
TLC Board had the authority to promulgate the rule.  Second, it examined 
whether the TLC Board exceeded its regulatory powers in violation of the 
nondelegation doctrine.  Whereas New York focused on the city charter to 
answer these overarching questions,281 Ohio examined whether the TLC 
Board’s powers conflicted with state law. 
First, applying statutory rules of construction set forth in the Ohio 
Revised Code (“the Code” or “the Revised Code”) and from the court’s 
own precedent,282 the court concluded that the Code’s other provisions 
limited the seemingly broad language of § 3709.21 because the Ohio 
General Assembly intended for the entire state public health statute283 to be 
effective284 and feasibly executed.285  Similarly, the court stated that words 
in a statute must not be construed to be redundant or to ignore any other 
word in the statute.286  Moreover, courts may consider similar laws to 
determine legislative intent287 and should give a reasonable construction to 
each title of the Code to ensure that each has proper force in relation to the 
others.288  Consequently, the court considered § 3709.21 in the context of 
the full chapter289 and full code.290 
 
conflicting with the respective local charters); infra notes 370–74 and accompanying text 
(describing how Massachusetts examined the issue of health regulations conflicting with the 
respective local charters). 
 277. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 540–41. 
 278. Id. at 541. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See supra Part II.A.1.  Though New York addressed a more specific question of 
whether the NYC Board had “legislative authority” to promulgate the Sugary Drinks Portion 
Cap Rule, both courts essentially examined whether the respective boards had the legal 
authority to promulgate the regulations. 
 281. See supra notes 228–34 and accompanying text. 
 282. See, e.g., D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 542. 
 283. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. XXXVII (West 2013).  Title 37 is called “Health—
Safety—Morals”; titles are further broken down into chapters. 
 284. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 541 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.47(B) (listing the 
presumptions the general assembly works under when enacting statutes)). 
 285. See id. at 542 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.47). 
 286. See id. at 543 (citing several cases for the proposition). 
 287. See id. at 541–42 (citing State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 132 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio 
1956), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49(D) to explain how courts should construe 
ambiguous statutes). 
 288. See id. at 542 (citing Maxfield v. Brooks, 144 N.E. 725 (Ohio 1924)). 
 289. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. XXXVII, ch. 3709.  Chapter 3709 of the health statute is 
entitled “Health Districts.” 
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Doing so, the court concluded that the general assembly did not intend to 
grant local boards of health plenary authority to promulgate any regulation 
the TLC Board believed necessary for public health purposes because such 
a reading would render large portions of Revised Code Title 37 and other 
titles superfluous.291  Identifying examples from § 3709 and the rest of the 
Code, the court described in detail which specific areas of public health 
local boards of health can regulate.292 
Second, the court considered the underlying nondelegation issue by 
examining whether the TLC Board was granted implicit power to 
promulgate the rule.293  The court first explained that though local boards of 
health are granted broad regulatory powers,294 at times boards take actions 
that impermissibly surpass the scope of their administrative rulemaking 
authority.295  As agencies may only exercise the regulatory power conferred 
upon them by the general assembly, these actions turn their regulatory 
efforts into legislative action.296 
Furthermore, the court explained that the general assembly’s grant of 
power may be explicit or implicit.297  Implied powers exist only to the 
extent that they are necessary to exercise an express power.298  Thus, if 
there is no explicit power, there necessarily is no implicit grant of power to 
effect an explicit power.299  If there is any question as to whether the 
general assembly intended to delegate a power or to the scope of such 
power, the doubt must be resolved against the grant.300  As the TLC Board 
was not expressly delegated the plenary power to promulgate any regulation 
 
 290. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 542.  This meant that the court not only considered the 
Health Districts chapter of the health law, but also other laws such as Ohio Revised Code 
Annotated title IX, chapter 955, the chapter that governs dog ownership. See id. at 543. 
 291. See id.  For example, Ohio Revised Code § 955.26 allows a health district board of 
health to quarantine and vaccinate dogs for rabies. See id. at 543.  The enactment of this 
provision indicated to the court that Ohio Revised Code § 3709.21 did not vest local boards 
with plenary authority; if it did, Ohio Revised Code § 955.26, as well as many other sections, 
would be redundant. See id. 
 292. See id. at 542–43 (noting a few of those areas to be in construction and demolition 
matters; sewage and disposal systems; and monitoring food preparation places).  The court 
also explained that a narrow reading of Ohio Revised Code § 3709.21 would not 
“eviscerate” the ability of boards of health to effectively and expeditiously respond to new 
public health threats because the general assembly has delegated emergency action powers in 
other provisions of the code. See id. at 546–47. 
 293. By contrast, New York examined the nondelegation issue by applying the four-part 
Boreali test. See supra notes 240–52 and accompanying text. 
 294. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 545 (citing Weber v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Health, 74 
N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ohio 1947)). 
 295. See id. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See id. at 545–56.  This is a Dillon’s Rule-type interpretation:  when there is a 
question about which powers a local government has, the power is narrowly construed. See 
BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 270.; cf. Diller, supra note 71, at 1870 (coming to 
a similar conclusion about the Washington case conducting a “Dillon’s Rule type 
approach”). 
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it deemed necessary,301 it also lacked an implied power to adopt the 
smoking ban.302  Moreover, the court affirmed that § 3709.21 was a rules-
enabling statute:  it governs procedure, but does not grant substantive 
regulatory authority.303  Thus, the actual regulatory authority to act in a 
specific public health area must come from an additional, specific grant of 
authority from the general assembly.304 
Citing statistics and health reports about the harms of smoking, the court 
concluded that despite how “well intentioned and beneficial” the Regulation 
may have been, the court would not extend by implication the general 
assembly’s grant of authority beyond the above explained limits.305  
“[U]nless the General Assembly or a local municipality with home-rule 
power decides otherwise,” the TLC Board did not have the authority to 
adopt the Regulation.306 
3.  Tacoma-Pierce County:  
Delegation As Defined by Preemption 
In Entertainment Industry Coalition v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health 
Department,307 the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated the Tacoma-
Pierce County Board of Health’s (“TPC BOH” or “the TPC Board”) 
resolution (“the Resolution”) prohibiting smoking in all public 
establishments.308  The court considered whether this local regulation 
conflicted with existing state law and found that it did.309  Like 
Massachusetts,310 the court found that the TPC Board had broad regulatory 
powers to promulgate health regulations.311  Accordingly, the court did not 
focus on whether the TPC Board had power to promulgate the rule like the 
New York312 and Ohio313 courts did.  Rather, it focused on whether the 
broad power the TPC Board did have conflicted with higher state power.  
The analysis, however, mirrors the Ohio analysis314 in that it looks 
exclusively to state law as opposed to local law.315 
 
 301. See supra notes 282–92 and accompanying text. 
 302. See D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 546. 
 303. See id. at 547. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. at 549. 
 306. Id. (footnote omitted).  This suggests that though the state had not granted this 
power, either the city of Toledo or Lucas County—if it adopted a charter—could grant the 
TLC Board the authority to promulgate the Regulation. 
 307. 105 P.3d 985 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 308. See id. at 986–87. 
 309. See id. at 987–88. 
 310. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 311. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987. 
 312. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 313. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 314. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 315. Cf. supra Part II.A.1; infra Part II.A.4. 
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In 1852, the Oregon Territory legislature formed Pierce County, which 
later was recognized as a legal subdivision of Washington State.316  The 
city of Tacoma is located within Pierce County.317  State law provides that 
its counties have a commission form of government.318  In 1948, however, 
a constitutional amendment allowed counties to adopt home rule charters 
that would grant them, inter alia, the power to form county governments 
different than those provided for by state law.319  Pierce County adopted a 
home rule charter in 1981 and subsequently changed its government 
structure—instead of a commissioner form of government, it now has a 
council-elected executive form of government,which is similar to a mayor-
city council form of government.320  Voters elect the county executive, and 
they also elect the city council as the legislative branch.321  However, as 
many commentators have noted, Washington home rule does not actually 
grant much power to localities.322 
In a council-elected executive form of government, the county’s 
legislative body establishes either a county health department or a health 
district to address public health issues.323  The health department or health 
district further establishes a local board of health to supervise all public 
health matters.324  In Pierce County and other counties with a home rule 
charter, the county has legislative authority to appoint to the board both 
elected officials and nonelected members.325 
On December 3, 2003, the TPC BOH adopted a resolution mandating 
smoke free air in all indoor places including areas at a distance of twenty-
five feet from doors and windows, including ventilation areas of those 
indoor places.326  The Resolution placed on local businesses stricter 
 
 316. See WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Pierce County Profile, EMP. SEC. DEP’T, WASH. 
STATE (Aug. 2014), https://fortress.wa.gov/esd/employmentdata/reports-publications/ 
regional-reports/county-profiles/pierce-county-profile [http://perma.cc/BZT9-JBC4]. 
 317. See About Tacoma, PIERCE COUNTY, WASH., http://www.co.pierce.wa.us/index.aspx? 
nid=659 (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/9E66-RYCU]. 
 318. See WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 5; Meredith A. Newman & Nicholas P. Lovrich, 
Washington, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 52, at 438; County Forms of 
Government, MRSC:  LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUCCESS, http://www.mrsc.org/subjects/ 
governance/locgov12.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/D26T-HAVX]. 
 319. See WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4; Newman & Lovrich, supra note 318, at 438; County 
Forms of Government, supra note 318. 
 320. See County Forms of Government, supra note 318. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See, e.g., Newman & Lovrich, supra note 318, at 437 (noting that courts often apply 
Dillon’s Rule in construing home rule powers, thus affirming the “state’s preeminence in 
intergovernmental relationships”); Michael Monroe Kellogg Sebree, Comment, One Century 
of Constitutional Home Rule:  A Progress Report?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 155, 177 (1989) 
(calling Washington home rule “illusory”); Richard Shattuck, A Cry for Reform in 
Construing Washington Municipal Corporation Statutes—Chemical Bank v. Washington 
Public Power Supply Systems, 59 WASH. L. REV. 653, 655 (1984) (noting that Washington 
adopted a narrow Dillon’s Rule-type approach to home rule). 
 323. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.05, 70.08, 70.46 (West 2011). 
 324. See id. § 70.05.060. 
 325. See id. § 70.05.035. 
 326. See Entm’t Indus. Coal. v. Tacoma-Pierce Cnty. Health Dep’t, 105 P.3d 985, 987 
(Wash. 2005) (en banc).  Pierce County was the first locality in Washington to issue such a 
sweeping ban. See Sandi Doughton, Pierce County Adopts Sweeping Ban on Smoking; Legal 
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smoking restrictions than did state law327:  the Washington Clean Indoor 
Air Act (“the State Smoking Act”) provided, “No person may smoke in a 
public place except in designated smoking areas.”328  Though the State 
Smoking Act limited smoking, it still allowed bars, taverns, bowling alleys, 
tobacco shops, and restaurants to be designated as smoking areas in their 
entirety.329  The state law further provided that local health departments 
could adopt regulations to implement the law.330  The Entertainment 
Industry Coalition challenged the Resolution, claiming it conflicted with the 
State Smoking Act331 because the Resolution mandated a total smoking ban 
in public areas expressly exempted under the state law.332 
To determine whether the local regulation conflicted with higher state 
law, the court applied a preemption analysis.333  Under state law, local 
health departments had broad power to adopt regulations.334  That broad 
delegation, however, did not include the power to promulgate regulations 
that conflict with state law.335  Such a conflict exists when a local 
regulation prohibits something that is permitted by state law; that regulation 
is thus invalid under “conflict preemption,” which occurs when an 
ordinance and statute cannot be harmonized.336 
 
Fight Ahead, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 4, 2003, 12:07 AM), http://community.seattletimes. 
nwsource.com/archive/?date=20031204&slug=smokeban040 [http://perma.cc/BHX7-TFZS].  
King County and Spokane, two other Washington counties, also considered banning indoor 
smoking, but declined to do so because their lawyers and the Attorney General determined 
they lacked the necessary legal authority. See id.  The Pierce City Council had considered a 
ban at least once before in 1993, but rejected it. See Associated Press, Smoking Ban Rejected 
by Pierce County Council, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 26, 1993, 12:00 AM), http://community. 
seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19930326&slug=1692640 [http://perma.cc/QU8K 
-Q9EG]. 
 327. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987. 
 328. See id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.040(1) (West 2004).  This statute 
was repealed in 2005 and replaced with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.030 (West 2011), 
a law prohibiting smoking in all public places and places of employment.  It is beyond the 
scope of this Note to consider the currentness of the laws examined in these decisions.  
Rather, this Note focuses on the analytical methods used by courts to determine whether a 
health board may regulate in a certain public health area. 
 329. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.040(1). 
 330. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.080. This provision also allowed local fire 
departments or fire districts to adopt implementation regulations. Id.; see also Entm’t Indus. 
Coal., 105 P.3d at 987. 
 331. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 70.160.040(1). 
 332. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987.  Presumably, the TPC Board passed the 
Resolution under the regulatory authority provided by the state law that described the local 
board of health’s powers and duties, as well as under the State Smoking Act that granted 
local boards power to implement it. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.05.060(3) (West 2007) 
(stating that local boards of health shall “[e]nact such local rules and regulations as are 
necessary in order to preserve, promote and improve the public health and provide for the 
enforcement thereof”); Id § 70.160.080 (“Local fire departments or fire districts and local 
health departments may adopt regulations as required to implement this chapter.”). 
 333. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987–88; see also supra notes 106–10 and 
accompanying text. 
 334. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 70.05.060. 
 335. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 987. 
 336. See id. at 987–88. 
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By prohibiting all smoking in indoor public places, the local regulation 
made it impossible for local business owners to designate smoking areas as 
permitted by the State Smoking Act.337 
Because the TPC Board was not expressly granted authority to 
promulgate rules inconsistent with the State Smoking Act, it did not have 
that power.338  After all, a statutory delegation to an agency or board must 
be denied if there is any doubt as to the delegation’s existence.339  By 
explicitly mandating smoke-free public indoor areas, the regulation 
impermissibly eviscerated the state law exemption and thus was invalid.340 
4.  Barnstable:  Deference to Local Power 
In Tri-Nel Management v. Board of Health,341 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts upheld the Barnstable Board of Health’s 
(“Barnstable BOH” or “the Barnstable Board”) regulation proscribing 
smoking in food service establishments, lounges, and bars.342  The court 
found that the Barnstable Board did not exceed the state legislature’s grant 
of authority.343  Applying aspects of the analyses in the preceding case 
studies, Massachusetts considered both whether the Barnstable Board had 
the power to adopt the regulation and also whether its regulation conflicted 
with state law. 
Massachusetts has a long history of local government, dating back to 
precolonial times.344  In 1966, Massachusetts formally amended its 
constitution to add the Home Rule Amendment, which provides local 
governments the power to determine which governmental structure best 
suits the locality’s needs.345  The Home Rule Procedures Act further defines 
home rule authority.346  By delegating home rule power to the 
municipalities, the Massachusetts legislature seemingly retains considerable 
control over them; however, the state generally “honor[s] the principle and 
tradition of local government.”347 
 
 337. See id. at 987; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.040(1). 
 338. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 988. 
 339. See id.; Diller, supra note 71, at 1870 (calling this a “Dillon’s Rule-like approach to 
the agency’s powers”). 
 340. See Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 988.  Anticipating that the court may find the 
regulation preempted, the TPC Board had offered two counterarguments based on the 
nondelegation and equal protection doctrines. See id.  The court explained that both 
doctrines were misapplied and unpersuasive. See id. 
 341. 741 N.E.2d 37 (Mass. 2001). 
 342. See id. at 40. 
 343. See id. 
 344. See Meredith Ramsay, Massachusetts, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 52, at 
203–04; see also MASS. CONST. art. LXXXIX, § 1 (“It is the intention of this article to 
reaffirm the customary and traditional liberties of the people with respect to the conduct of 
their local government, and to grant and confirm to the people of every city and town the 
right of self-government in local matters . . . .”). 
 345. See MASS. CONST. art. LXXXIX, § 6; Ramsay, supra note 344, at 204. 
 346. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43B (West 2014). 
 347. Ramsay, supra note 344, at 205; see also George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of 
State Restraint upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 20 STETSON L. REV. 
845, 859 n.63 (1991) (noting both that Massachusetts does not limit municipal power or state 
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The town of Barnstable was established in 1639.348  Barnstable has since 
adopted a home rule charter.349  Though called a town, its charter labels it a 
city, thus making it a municipal corporation.350  Barnstable has a town 
manager-town council government.351  The town council appoints the town 
manager352 and may remove the manager.353 
Local boards of health in Massachusetts are local arms of both the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health and the Massachusetts 
Department of Environmental Protection.354  Town boards of health are 
composed of three or more people that are either appointed by the town’s 
board of selectmen or elected directly by the townspeople.355  Reflecting 
Massachusetts’s history of strong home rule, the board of selectmen may 
even serve as the board of health under certain circumstances.356 
Barnstable has a three-member board of health appointed by the town 
council.357  State law does not impose any expertise requirements for 
appointment to the board of health.358 Though local boards of health are 
empowered by the state, local government charters retain power over how 
local health agencies function; Barnstable reserves the right to abolish the 
agency and appoint its officers.359 
On February 10, 2000, the Barnstable BOH adopted a regulation that 
absolutely banned smoking “in all food service establishments, lounges and 
bars.”360  The Barnstable Board contended it had authority to act pursuant 
to a state statute that provided a board may make “reasonable health 
regulations” subject to certain procedural requirements.361  Prior to the 
effective date, Tri-Nel Management, Inc. (doing business as The 
Windjammer Lounge) sued for a preliminary injunction to prevent 
enforcement of the regulation.362 
 
authority to deny municipal power and that Massachusetts adopts a liberal test for 
determining when control measures should be applied). 
 348. History of Barnstable County, Massachusetts, CAPECODHISTORY.US (July 2006), 
http://capecodhistory.us/Deyo/Barnstable.htm [http://perma.cc/6W5L-754F]. 
 349. See CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, § 1-2 (2004), http://www. 
townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf [http://perma.cc/EC5R-LQ4H]. 
 350. See id. § 1-4; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 351. See CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, § 1-3, http://www. 
townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf [http://perma.cc/EC5R-LQ4H]. 
 352. See id. § 4-1. 
 353. See id. § 4-7. 
 354. See More About Massachusetts Boards of Health, MASS. ASS’N OF HEALTH BOARDS, 
http://www.mahb.org/boh.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/5E98-6LF5]. 
 355. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 1 (West 2014). 
 356. See id. § 21. 
 357. See CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, § 10-7(k)(3), http://www. 
townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf [http://perma.cc/EC5R-LQ4H]. 
 358. See Diller, supra note 71, at 1879. 
 359. See CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, §§ 2-4, 5-1(a)(1), http://www. 
townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf [http://perma.cc/EC5R-LQ4H]; see also 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 17. 
 360. See Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 2001). 
 361. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 31; Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 40. 
 362. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 40. 
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The court explained why each of the plaintiff’s arguments were 
unsupported by law.  Four arguments concerned the Barnstable Board’s 
scope of power as defined by the state enabling statute, the state 
constitution, and the town charter.  The other arguments addressed potential 
conflicts with state laws. 
First, the court stated that the board did not exceed the authority granted 
by the state public health statute363 because its plain language indicated that 
boards may adopt reasonable health regulations.364  Next, the court 
considered the Barnstable Board’s expertise in the matter.365  Plaintiffs 
argued that the regulation was unreasonable because exposure to tobacco 
smoke in bars and restaurants was insufficient to adversely affect health.366  
In assessing the regulation’s reasonableness, the court gave the regulation 
the same level of deference it would to a legislative enactment, noting that 
“[h]ealth regulations have a strong presumption of validity.”367  Moreover, 
the court deferred to the Barnstable Board’s expertise and experience 
regarding smoking.368  Based on this expertise and the rational relationship 
between the regulation and its stated health purpose, the court found the 
regulation reasonable.369 
Furthermore, the court was unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the Barnstable Board’s actions violated the town charter’s “Division of 
Powers” provision.370  The town charter provided that “[a]ll legislative 
powers of the town shall be exercised by a town council.”371  The court 
noted that the charter also stated that all town powers are vested in the town 
council, unless otherwise provided by law or by the charter.372  Here, the 
Barnstable administrative code stated that “regulatory” committees, such as 
the Barnstable Board, have “legal authority to promulgate rules and 
regulations.”373  Hence, like the state legislature, the town council also 
delegated to the Barnstable Board regulatory power to protect the town’s 
public health.374 
 
 363. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 § 31 (“Boards of health may make reasonable 
health regulations.”). 
 364. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 41. 
 365. See id. at 41–42. 
 366. See id. at 41. 
 367. See id. 
 368. See id. at 41–42.  The court noted that though the plaintiff’s presented no evidence 
for their contention that tobacco smoke cannot cause negative health effects from only 
limited contact, the defendant Barnstable BOH presented four reports to the contrary. See id. 
at 41–42 n.7. 
 369. See id. at 41. 
 370. See id. at 45 (quoting CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, § 1-3 (2004), 
http://www.townofbarnstable.us/TownClerk/TownCode.pdf [http://perma.cc/EC5R-LQ4H]). 
 371. See id. (quoting CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, § 1-3). 
 372. See id.; see also CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, § 2-3. 
 373. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45–46; see also BARNSTABLE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODE § 241-8(I)(1)(b) (stating that standing committees, such as the Barnstable Board, have 
“legal authority to promulgate rules and regulations, decide individual cases and enact 
policy”). 
 374. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45–46. 
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The plaintiffs also raised a series of arguments involving state law.  The 
court considered whether the state public health law375 delegated authority 
in a manner that violated the Massachusetts constitution’s separation of 
powers provision.376  Plaintiffs argued the provision prohibited the state 
legislature from delegating to local governments and local boards of health 
the power to make laws.377  Still, the court recognized that whether a 
delegation is proper is “a question of degree” and not an inflexible 
principle.378 
To determine whether the state legislature had improperly delegated 
legislative power, the court considered three factors:  (1) whether the 
legislature delegated the task to make essential policy decisions instead of 
the task to implement “legislatively determined policy”; (2) whether the 
state law provided adequate guidance for the local authority to implement 
the legislatively determined policy; and (3) whether the act included 
safeguards to control abuse of discretion.379  First, the state’s legal history 
indicated that the state legislature made an appropriate policy decision in 
delegating to local municipalities the power to adopt reasonable regulations 
about local public health.380  Furthermore, the state made a policy decision 
to regulate smoking and even allowed municipalities to adopt stricter 
regulations.381  Second, by mandating that local regulations must address 
public health and be reasonable, the state legislature had provided sufficient 
guidance for the regulation’s implementation.382  Third, these limitations 
outlined the “boundaries of regulatory discretion” and prevented the 
Barnstable Board from abusing its discretion.383  Thus, the court found that 
all three factors were satisfied and, therefore, no separation of powers 
violation existed.384 
The plaintiffs also argued that the state public health law385 delegated the 
specific authority to regulate only areas enumerated in other sections of the 
same chapter.386  The court discredited this argument.387  In prior cases, the 
 
 375. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 31 (West 2014). 
 376. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 44; see also MASS. CONST. art. XXX. 
 377. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 44. 
 378. See id. 
 379. See id. at 44–45 (quoting Trailer Park Inc. v. Chelmsford, 469 N.E.2d 1259 (Mass. 
1984)).  Though this test sounds very similar to the nondelegation Boreali test applied in the 
New York context, see supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text, Boreali was decided 
three years after Tri-Nel Mgmt. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355–58 (N.Y. 
1987).  Neither case references the other. 
 380. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45 (citing case law from 1831 and 1903 that 
showed that localities may regulate local public health); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
111, § 31. 
 381. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 22. 
 382. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45. 
 383. See id. 
 384. See id. at 45–46. 
 385. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 31. 
 386. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 42. 
 387. See id. (noting the case law that the plaintiffs relied upon for this argument predated 
the enactment of state public health law and thus did not support their argument); cf. Part 
II.A.2–3 (describing how the Ohio and Washington courts were persuaded by similar 
arguments). 
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court had interpreted the state public health law as having created “a 
comprehensive, separate, additional source of authority for health 
regulations” that gave boards plenary power to adopt reasonable health 
regulations.388 
Next, the court found no indication that the legislature intended to 
preempt local governments from promulgating smoking bans.389  Plaintiffs 
argued that the existence of a state smoking law390 evinced legislative intent 
to preempt local governments from promulgating smoking bans, thus 
violating the Home Rule Amendment.391  The court noted that the plaintiffs 
misconstrued the Home Rule Amendment:  the amendment granted local 
governments broad powers that they did not have prior to the amendment, 
but it did not act as a limitation on local governments from legislating in 
areas in which the state already legislated.392  The amendment only required 
that municipalities exercise power consistent with the state constitution and 
state laws.393 
Finally, the court found the regulation did not conflict with the state law 
governing smoking in public places because there was no clear legislative 
intent to preclude local action.394  The state law prohibited smoking in 
restaurants with a seating capacity exceeding seventy-five persons, except 
in specifically designated smoking areas.395  The state legislature, however, 
specifically authorized municipalities to impose stricter smoking 
regulations in public places.396  The local law did not conflict with the state 
law, but rather furthered it.397 
 
 388. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 42 (emphasis added) (citing Bd. of Health of 
Woburn v. Sousa, 338 Mass. 547, 550 (1938)). 
 389. See id. at 43. 
 390. The decision does not indicate which state smoking law this refers to.  Presumably, 
they are referring to MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 22. See infra note 394. 
 391. See infra note 394; see also MASS. CONST. art. LXXXIX, § 6 (“Any city or town 
may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any 
power or function which the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not 
inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with 
powers reserved to the general court . . . and which is not denied, either expressly or by clear 
implication, to the city or town by its charter.”).  Massachusetts also has a home rule statute 
that was not implicated in this argument. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43B. 
 392. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 43. 
 393. See id. 
 394. See id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 22. 
 395. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 43–44; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 22. 
 396. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 44; cf. supra notes 327–30 and accompanying text 
(describing how the corresponding Washington State statute allowed local health 
departments authority to adopt regulations to implement the state smoking law). But see 
supra Part II.A.2 (describing the interaction between a smoking regulation promulgated by 
Toledo-Lucas County, Ohio, and Ohio state law). 
 397. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 44; cf. supra notes 339–42 and accompanying text 
(describing how the local smoking regulation in Pierce County, Washington, frustrated the 
state smoking law application). 
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B.  Comparing the Case Studies:  
Commonalities in Methodologies 
Though the above cases may appear incongruent, the judicial methods 
employed therein share common features.  The decisions regarding New 
York, New York;398 Lucas County, Ohio;399 Pierce County, Washington;400 
and Barnstable, Massachusetts,401 fall on a continuum from most restrictive 
to least restrictive of their local board of health’s regulatory power.  Though 
New York and Ohio found that their boards did not have broad regulatory 
power, Washington and Massachusetts found that their boards did.  Yet the 
courts determined that local public health boards for a city in New York and 
the counties in Ohio and Washington surpassed their regulatory authority 
(whether limited or not).  The local public health board for a small town in 
Massachusetts, however, acted within its authority.  In arriving at these 
conclusions, the courts addressed—sometimes implicitly—two overarching 
questions:  First, did the board have the legal authority to promulgate the 
rule?  Second, did the board’s exercise of power conflict with a higher 
governmental power? 
In addressing these issues, New York and Ohio employed similar 
analyses.  First, they considered whether the boards had broad authority to 
promulgate rules—and in New York’s case, the court more specifically 
asked if the board had legislative authority.402  To answer this threshold 
question, New York looked primarily to local law,403 and Ohio looked 
exclusively to state law;404 both ultimately found that their boards did not 
have broad authority.405  In so doing, the courts highlighted that there is no 
one body of law a court must look to:  local and/or state law may define 
local agency action.406 
Second, the New York and Ohio courts analyzed whether the boards 
surpassed their limited regulatory powers.407  Both courts applied a 
nondelegation analysis and found that the boards did exceed their 
regulatory authority.408  Accordingly, both regulations were struck down.409 
By contrast, Washington and Massachusetts found that their boards had 
broad authority410 and consequently focused their inquiries on whether the 
boards’ regulations conflicted with state law.411  Washington conducted an 
 
 398. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 399. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 400. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 401. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 402. See supra notes 224–39, 282–92 and accompanying text. 
 403. See supra notes 229–34 and accompanying text. 
 404. See supra notes 282–92 and accompanying text. 
 405. See supra notes 238, 291 and accompanying text. 
 406. See Diller, supra note 71, at 1868; see also supra notes 176–86, 306 and 
accompanying text. 
 407. See supra notes 240–52, 293–306 and accompanying text. 
 408. See supra notes 240–52, 293–306 and accompanying text. 
 409. See supra notes 252, 306 and accompanying text. 
 410. See supra notes 334, 363–64 and accompanying text. 
 411. See supra notes 333–40, 365–83, 385–97 and accompanying text. 
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explicit preemption analysis,412 whereas Massachusetts conducted a 
nondelegation analysis similar to that employed in New York,413 indicating 
that both preemption and nondelegation analyses may be appropriate 
mechanisms by which to determine a local board of health’s scope of 
power.  Pierce County’s local regulation was struck down because it 
conflicted with the state smoking law, making the state law’s 
implementation impossible.414  The Barnstable regulation, however, did not 
conflict with Massachusetts state law because the state legislature had 
specifically allowed localities to implement stricter regulations than the 
state law; the regulation was upheld.415 
Framing these analytical methods according to the above two 
overarching questions may help to harmonize these seemingly incongruent 
decisions.  Yet it still leaves unanswered certain questions:  Why did 
different courts rely on state or local law or a combination thereof?  Why 
did some courts apply the nondelegation doctrine, but others a preemption 
analysis?  Why does home rule not uniformly validate these agency 
actions?416  The next part of this Note explores how different historical, 
governmental, and political influences may help answer these questions and 
further suggests that an explicit “step-one” inquiry be undertaken when 
analyzing local board of health action—a novel solution not yet proposed in 
local administrative law. 
III.  HISTORY, GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS:  
GUIDING FACTORS IN JUDICIAL EXAMINATION 
OF LOCAL HEALTH AGENCY POWER 
When analyzing future local board of health action, courts and 
policymakers should consider the approaches described above.  But which 
of those approaches best suits analysis of a particular agency’s actions?  
Should courts and policymakers apply state law or local law?  This part 
proposes that courts and policymakers should conduct a step-one analysis 
of the locality’s unique character (including factors such as history, 
governmental structure, home rule grant of power, population, and politics) 
before they apply one—or part of one—of the methods described in the 
case studies.417 
Part III.A compares and contrasts the distinctive histories, governmental 
structures, and politics of New York City, Lucas Country, Pierce County, 
and Barnstable.  Part III.B considers how these three considerations may 
 
 412. See supra notes 333–40 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra notes 379–83 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 415. See supra note 397 and accompanying text. 
 416. See Roberta A. Kaplan & Jacob H. Hupart, Can New York City Govern Itself?  The 
Incongruity of the Court of Appeals’ Recent Cases Regarding Regulation of New York City 
by New York City, 78 ALB. L. REV. 105, 116 (2015) (“[T]he legal principle of home rule 
should arguably provide greater protection to regulations promulgated by New York City, as 
opposed to mere administrative law, since it draws from a deeper and more potent source 
[home rule].”). 
 417. See supra Part II.A. 
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specifically impact which arguments courts find persuasive.  Finally, Part 
III.C proposes that when considering the scope of a local board’s powers, 
courts and policymakers should first look to unique characteristics of the 
locality the board serves. 
A.  Explaining the Varied Judicial Review 
of Local Board of Health Action 
Though the state supreme courts discussed above used similar analyses, 
these courts may have analyzed different factors and ultimately decided the 
cases differently because of the following considerations:  (1) the locality’s 
history, (2) its governmental structure, and (3) its politics.  Though the 
decisions tend not to directly reference any of these three factors, the below 
survey of the four localities’ history, government structure, and politics 
demonstrate that there are common threads that may indeed undergird the 
decisions. 
New York City and Barnstable are the oldest of the four localities 
discussed:  New York City was established in 1624418 and Barnstable in 
1639.419  They are both municipal corporations.420  But despite their similar 
length of existence and municipal characters, they do not give their local 
boards of health similar levels of discretion.  This is possibly due to 
population size:  in 2014, New York City had an estimated population of 
8,491,079421 while Barnstable had one of 44,529.422  New York City’s 
significantly larger population necessitates a larger administrative 
bureaucracy than Barnstable, which perhaps leads courts to more strictly 
scrutinize New York City agencies to ensure compliance with the law.423  
Though the New York Constitution and Home Rule Law both grant New 
York City seemingly broad powers, the New York Court of Appeals has 
consistently found that the state may enact laws that restrict local power.424  
Massachusetts, by contrast, has a long history of limited state involvement 
in local matters.425  How broadly the New York and Massachusetts courts 
interpret local board of health regulatory power seems tied directly to the 
size of their administrative regimes and legal precedent. 
In contrast to cities, counties are involuntary subdivisions of the state.426  
Accordingly, counties’ power structures are more “top-down” than 
 
 418. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 419. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
 420. See supra notes 198, 350 and accompanying text. 
 421. New York (city), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 3, 2015, 3:08 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html [http://perma.cc/D54N-4YJP]. 
 422. Barnstable Town (city), Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 24, 2015, 12:20 
PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/25/2503690.html [http://perma.cc/DR3V-
MRGQ]. 
 423. See supra notes 133–40 and accompanying text (describing concerns specific to state 
and local administrative law systems and how courts react to these systems). 
 424. See Stonecash, supra note 201, at 303. 
 425. See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying text. 
 426. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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“bottom-up.”427  Moreover, the counties have existed for less time than 
New York City and Barnstable; the counties have also limited control over 
local matters.  Lucas County was established in 1788,428 and Pierce County 
was established in 1852.429  They were both offered county home rule, but 
only Pierce County has enacted a county home rule charter.430  Despite this 
difference, commentators have noted that neither has significant home rule 
power.431  Ultimately, they seem to fall into the traditional category of 
quasi-corporations that exist to carry out state needs.432 
Furthermore, the four states adopted their home rule amendments 
chronologically in relation to their places on the continuum433:  New York 
in 1894 (most restrictive of local power),434 Ohio in 1933,435 Washington in 
1948,436 and Massachusetts in 1966 (least restrictive).437  Because the first 
three have a longer history of addressing the parameters of home rule 
power, they may have developed more stringent limitations on home rule 
than Massachusetts. 
Moreover, New York City, Lucas County, and Piece County are arguably 
more politicized than Barnstable—which was the only case study in which 
the local board of health was held to have acted within its delegated power.  
The localities differ in what types of governmental structures they utilize438:  
New York City has a strong mayor-council form of government,439 Lucas 
County has a commissioner system,440 Pierce County has a council-elected 
executive,441 and Barnstable has a manager-council form of government.442  
Because the New York City executive and legislative branches are both 
elected, the competition between the two is highly politicized and 
implicates separation of powers issues.443  The Lucas County board of 
 
 427. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 428. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
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 433. See supra Part II.B. 
 434. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX; Briffault, supra note 43, at 85–86. 
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 437. See MASS. CONST. art. 89, § 6; Ramsay, supra note 344, at 204. 
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Benedict, Note, Upsetting the Balance:  Ignoring the Separation of Powers Doctrines in 
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county commissioners is also elected, but shares administrative 
responsibility among the nine commissioners.444  Pierce County is like New 
York City in that the executive and legislative branches are both elected.445 
Barnstable, however, differs from the others because its council appoints 
their executive leaders.446  Its executive leaders are subject to council 
removal,447 theoretically leading to less politicization than in New York 
City, Lucas County, or Pierce County.448 
Courts examining localities with a history of conflict between the 
executive and legislative branches may be more sensitive to separation of 
powers issues than localities where management is less politicized.  For 
example, the New York courts have regularly addressed separation of 
powers issues between the mayor and the city council, two branches with a 
highly politicized relationship.449  Thus, in New York, the courts must step 
in to maintain a distinction between the two branches of government.450  By 
contrast, the line between Barnstable’s executive and legislative branches is 
harder to define because the legislature appoints the executive.451  When 
examining localities where local governments are more politicized, courts 
are more likely to be concerned about separation of powers and may look to 
state law, especially if local law fails to maintain a separation of powers 
between local branches of government in a sufficiently strong manner.452 
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Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule because the regulation should be approved by the council 
and not the NYC BOH) [http://perma.cc/Q65P-QGUB]. 
 450. See supra notes 80–81, 242–43 and accompanying text. 
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legislature to appoint their executive more strongly indicates that separation of powers 
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B.  Comparing and Contrasting 
the Persuasiveness of the Parties’ Arguments 
Each court relied on various factors to determine whether to uphold or 
strike down a local board of health’s regulations.  Some factors considered 
were:  (1) state laws and potential preemption reflecting a Dillon’s Rule-
like analysis; (2) separation of powers and nondelegation issues; (3) prior 
regulatory history; (4) local charters; and (5) agency expertise.  Whether a 
court found these factors dispositive (or even at all persuasive) may be 
explained by the locality’s history; the locality’s governmental structure, 
which may politicize local governmental relationships; and the state’s home 
rule history.453  Whether a locality is a municipal corporation or a quasi-
corporation implicates these three considerations. 
As to the first factor, all four courts considered higher state law to some 
extent, which in each case implicated some variation of preemption 
analysis.  New York briskly examined the relevant state law, likely because 
New York City is specifically exempted from many of the state’s public 
health law provisions.454  The court did, however, find it troubling that the 
NYC Board did not explain what would happen if an NYC Board 
regulation conflicted with a city council ordinance, which reflects a 
preemption-type concern.455  The Ohio court relied heavily on state statutes 
to determine how state laws other than the health agency enabling statute 
limited which areas the Lucas County Board of Health could regulate, 
thereby conducting an unnamed preemption analysis.456  Relying on an 
explicit preemption analysis, Washington looked specifically to its state 
smoking law to consider if it conflicted with the local smoking 
regulation.457  That the first three courts looked to provisions other than the 
statute that directly spoke about the scope of local health agency power 
reflects a Dillon’s Rule-like approach:  because state or local law did not 
explicitly grant the boards power to regulate sugary beverage consumption 
or smoking in public areas, that power was denied to them.458 
Only Massachusetts found the local regulation was not preempted by 
state law.459  This may be explained by Massachusetts’s long history of 
strong local self-government without state interference.460  By contrast, 
New York City, Lucas County, and Pierce County all are subject to state 
interference despite all three constitutions having been amended to provide 
home rule.  This may be in part because Massachusetts adopted home rule 
the latest—in 1966.461 
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 460. See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying text. 
 461. See supra note 345 and accompanying text. 
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Second, New York City’s governmental structure is more politicized than 
the others.462  In a municipality with a strong executive and a strong 
legislature, both branches may vie to gain more control.  Only New York 
considered who drafted the rule (although the court found it 
unimportant).463  The court possibly addressed the drafting issue because of 
the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule’s politicization, a portion limit rule that 
was described in the media as “[Mayor] Bloomberg’s Soda Ban.”464 
Nevertheless, separation of powers and nondelegation concerns are 
usually implicated when examining agency action because agency action 
bypasses the political process.465  Agencies are generally considered to be 
part of the executive branch of the government.466  As is the case in all four 
localities, agency members are often appointed and thus may not be 
accountable to voters.467  This accountability problem may be one reason 
that courts employ the nondelegation doctrine.468 
In point of fact, all but Washington considered separation of powers and 
nondelegation issues.  Once New York determined that the NYC Board did 
not have legislative powers, it applied the Boreali test to determine if it had 
crossed the line between rulemaking and lawmaking.469  Ohio also noted 
that agencies sometimes take actions that impermissibly exceed their 
administrative rulemaking powers; to determine if this was the case, the 
court looked to the Ohio Revised Code to see if it implicitly or explicitly 
granted the Lucas County Board of Health the power to regulate 
smoking.470  Massachusetts also considered the line between rulemaking 
and lawmaking.  The court applied a three-part test that was similar to the 
Boreali test, but ultimately concluded that the line was not surpassed in this 
context.471  Washington may not have applied a nondelegation test because 
of the precise nature of the local law:  its implementation clearly frustrated 
the state law implementation.472 
As to the third factor, though all four courts considered prior local board 
action to some extent, only the New York dissent undertook an extensive 
historical analysis of the NYC Board’s development and actions to support 
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the court’s conclusion that the board did have legislative powers.473  This 
historical analysis was likely seen as necessary because the NYC BOH has 
switched between state and city control several times and has undergone 
several name changes, which leaves uncertain whether it is a state or local 
creature.474  This was likely an important issue because of the separation of 
powers issues between the city and state.  In the county contexts, it is likely 
less necessary to examine the board history because the board is 
accountable to the counties, which are firmly state creatures.  In the case of 
Massachusetts, the court granted Barnstable Board regulations the same 
level of deference as they would to legislative enactments, which implies 
that whether the Barnstable Board was controlled by the state or locality 
was not terribly important.475 
Additionally, the New York and Massachusetts courts looked at their 
respective local charters; Ohio and Washington did not.  New York relied 
heavily on the New York City Charter in determining what powers the 
NYC Board had.476  Massachusetts considered the Barnstable Charter’s 
“Division of Powers” provision to conclude the town’s legislative powers 
were all vested in the council, but that the town had delegated to the 
Barnstable Board the regulatory power to protect public health.477  Because 
Lucas County has not adopted county home rule, it does not have a 
charter.478  Pierce County’s charter is not as extensive as the other 
charters.479  This difference in focus on local charters may further be 
explained by the fact that only New York and Massachusetts courts were 
faced with deciding between competing legislative directives:  the parties 
pointed to the local charter provisions as the source of the board’s authority 
and the courts necessarily had to look at those charters. 
Finally, only Massachusetts found the board’s expertise very 
persuasive.480  This may be because the Barnstable Board had specifically 
submitted four scientific reports in support of its position481 and again 
because of Massachusetts’s long tradition of deferring to local self-
government.482  Further, the New York court noted that the NYC Board 
could have chosen other common sense alternative methods to fight obesity 
rather than by limiting soda sizes—the court noted that these alternatives 
were not based on any sort of expertise, implying the court did not believe 
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the NYC Board actually relied on any real expertise in drafting the Sugary 
Drinks Portion Cap Rule.483 
C.  A Step-One Inquiry:  What Do the Locality’s History, 
Governmental Structure, and Politics Demonstrate? 
Before employing any of the analytical methods described above,484 a 
court or policymaker should first consider the unique circumstances of the 
locality that the board serves.  Such a step-one inquiry should include an 
examination of whether the locality is a municipal corporation or quasi-
corporation, what type of governmental form the local government takes, 
and how these two factors have—or have not—implicated both horizontal 
and vertical separation of powers issues.  The analysis should also consider 
to what extent separation of powers is implicated in the locality’s politics. 
This examination will help to demonstrate what method of inquiry is best 
suited to define the board’s powers and may also create a more consistent 
body of law within a state.  Moreover, such an open and direct 
acknowledgment of factors underlying judicial decisions may make the 
opinions more opaque—an opaqueness that was arguably lacking in the 
Sugary Drinks Portion Cap case.485 
For instance, some commentators voiced concerns that the Boreali test 
was inappropriately applied to the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule context 
because Boreali should not apply to state governmental actions—and not to 
local governmental actions.486  One might imagine that such criticism 
would be stronger if the court applied the Boreali test not to a large urban 
government (which arguably functions more like a state government than 
that of a much smaller locality) but to a small New York town.  This shows 
that though a particular test may be illuminating when applied to one local 
government, it may be ill-suited to another government that serves a smaller 
population or to one that has a smaller administrative agency infrastructure. 
Applied in the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule case, this “step-one” 
inquiry—examining whether New York City is a municipal or quasi-
corporation, the type of governmental form it takes, and how its political 
structure raises separation of powers concerns—may have addressed some 
of the issues raised by the dissent.  For example, the dissent maintained that 
Boreali should not apply to regulatory action taken by a city because the 
Boreali test relied on the state constitution.487  The majority, however, 
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applied the Boreali test because New York State courts have used the 
Boreali test whenever the separation of powers or nondelegation doctrines 
are implicated.488  This divide between the majority and the dissent reflects 
confusion over whether the NYC BOH was a city subagent subject to local 
control or a state agent subject to state law.489 
If New York City were first characterized as a voluntarily created 
municipality as opposed to an involuntarily organized quasi-corporation, 
then New York City is an agency of the state.  Assuming New York City 
controls the NYC BOH, the NYC BOH becomes a city subagent subject to 
local law—the NYC BOH is not a state-controlled agent with powers 
coequal to the city itself.  This all indicates that Boreali—a test developed 
to apply to a state agency—should probably not apply.490 
New York City, however, has a strong-mayor government and a long 
history of separation of powers conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches.491  In order to prevent the executive and legislative 
branches from encroaching onto each other’s authority, a court may need to 
step in—especially where, as here, the NYC BOH members were appointed 
by the mayor492 and the NYC BOH’s Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule was 
strongly influenced by the executive branch.493  Accordingly, the Boreali 
test—the test New York courts use when a separation of powers issue 
arises—should apply despite the NYC BOH not being subject to state 
control.  A nondelegation test defining when an agency implicates a 
separation of powers violation is likely the appropriate test because 
functional separation of powers concerns outweigh the formal difference 
between municipal corporations and quasi-corporations.  Ultimately, then, 
Boreali should have applied to the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule, but for 
reasons other than the Court of Appeals stated. 
CONCLUSION 
Determining the scope of a local board of health’s regulatory power is 
important for many reasons:  local boards may impermissibly regulate a 
state matter, their regulations may have broad effects surpassing the borders 
of the locality in which they are situated, the regulations may be more 
appropriately enacted by elected officials, and political players may use the 
boards to subvert the legislative process.  Moreover, local regulations are 
often replicated at the state or federal level, suggesting that when local 
boards of health do act, they should act within the legal parameters.  And 
because this requires different state courts to review local health agency 
 
 488. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 489. See supra notes 176–86, 242 and accompanying text. 
 490. See supra note 487 and accompanying text. 
 491. See supra notes 439, 449 and accompanying text. 
 492. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text. 
 493. See, e.g., Katherine Pratt, Lessons from the Demise of the Sugary Drink Portion Cap 
Rule, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 39, 47–52 (2015) (detailing Mayor Bloomberg’s 
involvement in how the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule was created, including how his 
New York City Obesity Task Force sought an alternative to a soda tax, which would be 
politically “out of the question”). 
2015] THE SCOPE OF LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH POWER 819 
action, incongruent local health agency discretion may result for different 
boards in different states—or even within different local boards of health in 
one state. 
An examination of how courts view and analyze the scope of local health 
agency power helps explain the place that local boards of health hold in the 
grander struggle between local and state governments.  Most importantly, 
this assessment of various state supreme court methodologies demonstrates 
that when future courts and policymakers review the parameters of a local 
board of health’s discretion, they should first consider the locality’s history, 
government structure, and politics. 
